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ABSTRACT
Advanced capabilities planned for the next generation of aircraft, including those
that will operate within the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen),
will necessarily include complex new algorithms and non-traditional software ele-
ments. These aircraft will likely incorporate adaptive control algorithms that will
provide enhanced safety, autonomy, and robustness during adverse conditions. Un-
manned aircraft will operate alongside manned aircraft in the National Airspace
(NAS), with intelligent software performing the high-level decision-making func-
tions normally performed by human pilots. Even human-piloted aircraft will nec-
essarily include more autonomy.
However, there are serious barriers to the deployment of new capabilities, espe-
cially for those based upon software including adaptive control (AC) and artiﬁcial
intelligence (AI) algorithms. Current civil aviation certiﬁcation processes are based
on the idea that the correct behavior of a system must be completely speciﬁed and
veriﬁed prior to operation. This report by Rockwell Collins and SIFT documents
our comprehensive study of the state of the art in intelligent and adaptive algorithms
for the civil aviation domain, categorizing the approaches used and identifying gaps
and challenges associated with certiﬁcation of each approach.
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1 Introduction
Advanced capabilities planned for the next generation of aircraft, including those
that will operate within the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen),
will necessarily include complex new algorithms and non-traditional software ele-
ments. These aircraft will likely incorporate adaptive control algorithms that will
provide enhanced safety, autonomy, and robustness in the presence of failures and
adverse ﬂight conditions. NextGen systems will encompass both airborne and
ground-based nodes with signiﬁcant computational elements acting in coordination
to maintain a safe and efﬁcient airspace. Unmanned aircraft will operate alongside
manned aircraft in the National Airspace (NAS), with intelligent software perform-
ing the high-level decision-making functions normally performed by human pilots.
Even human-piloted aircraft will necessarily include more autonomy to achieve
desirable characteristics such as ﬂight into increasingly congested areas, airspace
coordination with UAVs, and fuel- and time-optimized operations in free-ﬂight.
However, there are serious barriers to the deployment of new capabilities, es-
pecially for those based upon software including adaptive control (AC) and artiﬁ-
cial intelligence (AI) algorithms. Current civil aviation certiﬁcation processes are
based on the idea that the correct behavior of a system must be completely speci-
ﬁed and veriﬁed prior to operation. While systems based on artiﬁcial intelligence
and adaptive algorithms can be found in military and space ﬂight applications, they
have had only limited use in civil airspace due to the constraints and assumptions
of traditional safety assurance methods. These barriers will delay or prevent the
deployment of crucial safety functions and new capabilities that could be of great
value to the public.
This report by Rockwell Collins and SIFT documents our comprehensive study
of the state of the art in intelligent and adaptive algorithms for the civil aviation
domain, categorizing the approaches used and identifying gaps and challenges as-
sociated with certiﬁcation of each approach. The research effort involved un-
derstanding different adaptive control and artiﬁcial intelligence algorithms being
applied to civil and military aviation. This required surveying published litera-
ture, as well as direct interactions with known experts in this ﬁeld. We organized
a workshop with researchers involved in developing adaptive control and artiﬁcial
intelligence approaches, especially those focused on aerospace applications. The
workshop helped us identify the spectrum of different approaches and algorithms,
and characterize their features that are relevant to certiﬁcation considerations.
In the remainder of this introduction, we discuss basic terminology and provide
a summary of recent research programs and similar studies. Section 2 provides an
overview of application areas within civil aviation that could beneﬁt from the adap-
tive technologies in our review. Section 3 reviews the current approach to certifying
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software for use in these applications. Section 4 summarizes a wide spectrum of
adaptive algorithms from the controls community, while Section 5 discusses algo-
rithms and approaches that stem from the AI ﬁeld. In each of these sections, we
identify the unique characteristics of each algorithm that may pose a challenge to
the current certiﬁcation processes. Section 6 summarizes those characteristics and
associated certiﬁcation challenges. Section 7 presents a set of suggested evolu-
tionary changes to the certiﬁcation processes that will enable adaptive technologies
to be certiﬁed and deployed with conﬁdence. We conclude in Section 8 with a
roadmap summarizing how different adaptive system approaches may be gradually
incorporated into civil aviation applications.
1.1 Terminology
This report focuses on two broad categories of advanced technologies that may be
useful in civil aviation: adaptive control systems and AI-based methods. In this
section we brieﬂy deﬁne these terms; however, distinguishing between them is not
strictly important to the intent of this survey. The main point of the survey is to
identify challenges to verifying and certifying advanced technologies, and suggest
a roadmap to overcoming those challenges.
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Figure 1: The roles of an adaptive intelligent system in closed-loop control.
Consider the active feedback loop shown in Figure 1. The four main steps in the
loop are 1) sense, 2) analyze, 3) decide, and 4) act [82]. For most aviation applica-
tions, the “action” is applied to a system that we can describe reasonably well when
it is operating nominally. If we have a good model of the system, then we can use
that model along with the observations we have made from analyzing our sensory
input to make a decision. However, it is very difﬁcult to develop a model that fully
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captures all of the ways that a system may behave. The characteristics of the sys-
tem may change signiﬁcantly in response to changes in the mission, environment,
threats, or failures— all of which are uncertain.
Traditionally, the computational element designed to control the system is ﬁxed.
In other words, the instructions that implement the “analyze and decide” steps are
developed in some software which is inherently deterministic, and that software is
subsequently certiﬁed relative to the original system requirements.
Adaptive System: A system in which the computational element of the ac-
tive feedback process changes in order to maintain desired performance in
response to failures, threats, or a changing environment.
With the introduction of adaptive controls or AI-based methods, the instructions
that implement the “analyze and decide” steps are not ﬁxed, but rather update over
time in response to the system behavior. In general, when intelligence is added
to the computational element, it 1) observes how it interacts with the system, 2)
learns from those observations, and 3) updates itself to improve its interaction. This
variability is the primary distinguishing feature that enables adaptive and intelligent
methods to outperform their static counterparts. It is also the root cause of the
certiﬁcation challenges, as following subsections elaborate.
1.1.1 Deﬁnitions of Adaptive Control
Adaptive Control (AC): A control policy with 1) parameters that may be ad-
justed, and 2) some mechanism for automatically adjusting those parameters
online based on measured performance.
Research in adaptive control dates back to the 1950’s, as ﬂight control engi-
neers worked to design automatic control policies for a new breed of experimental
aircraft, most notably the X-15 [5]. As these new aircraft were capable of reach-
ing higher altitudes and faster speeds, they stretched the ﬂight envelope beyond the
point where a single control policy could be used throughout. This experimental
work sparked research in adaptive control, where the controller gains adapt in some
way to the changing ﬂight condition. The most practical solution was to simply
pre-compute the controller gains over a grid of ﬂight conditions, and update them
online using a table-lookup. This practice is called gain-scheduled control, and has
been widely used in ﬂight controls as well as the broader controls community for
the last several decades.
In general, adaptive control methods involve two basic pieces: 1) a control pol-
icy with parameters that may be adjusted, and 2) some mechanism for adjusting
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those parameters. Continued research in adaptive control theory has led to a rich
mathematical framework to support the design and analysis of adaptive control al-
gorithms. Several distinct methods are discussed in Section 4.
1.1.2 Deﬁnitions of Artiﬁcial Intelligence
Traditionally, the deﬁnition of AI has centered around the goal of computers emu-
lating human intelligence. In 1981, Barr and Feigenbaum [6] deﬁned AI as: “the
part of computer science concerned with designing intelligent computer systems,
that is, systems that exhibit the characteristics we associate with intelligence in hu-
man behavior – understanding language, learning, reasoning, solving problems, and
so on.” In 1983, Elaine Rich [61] described the ﬁeld of AI as “the study of how to
make computers do things at which, at the moment, people are better.”
In 1998, Poole, Mackworth and Goebl provide a more useful deﬁnition, adopt-
ing the term computational intelligence: [60]
Computational intelligence is the study of the design of intelligent agents.
An agent is something that acts in an environment— it does something.
Agents include worms, dogs, thermostats, airplanes, humans, organiza-
tions, and society. An intelligent agent is a system that acts intelligently:
What it does is appropriate for its circumstances and its goal, it is ﬂexi-
ble to changing environments and changing goals, it learns from experi-
ence, and it makes appropriate choices given perceptual limitations and
ﬁnite computation.
For the purpose of this report, we deﬁne AI as a technological umbrella covering
the broad class of methods that ultimately support the operation of an intelligent
agent, as described above.
Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI): A broad class of computational methods that
are designed to operate with intelligence, primarily by 1) learning from ex-
perience, and 2) making decisions based on learned information to achieve a
goal.
This notion of intelligence is appropriate as we consider the utility of AI in avi-
ation, as well as a roadmap to certiﬁcation. In particular, we are interested in the
capabilities of 1) being ﬂexible, or adaptive, to changes in the goals or environ-
ment, and 2) learning from experience. These two characteristics, learning and
adaptation, are the two main ingredients for both AC and AI methods, provid-
ing the functional basis for enhancing performance and robustness over traditional
methods. In short, a system that can learn from and adapt to its environment may
be more capable than one that cannot.
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The unique attributes of an intelligent, adaptive system are also evident when we
examine the difference between automation and autonomy. The Air Force Research
Laboratory uses the following deﬁnitions: [4]
Automation: The system functions with no/little human operator involvement, how-
ever the system performance is limited to the speciﬁc actions it has been de-
signed to do. Typically these are well-deﬁned tasks that have predetermined
responses, i.e. simple rule-based responses.”
Autonomy: Systems which have a set of intelligence-based capabilities that allow
it to respond to situations that were not pre-programmed or anticipated in the
design (i.e. decision-based responses). Autonomous systems have a degree
of self-government and self-directed behavior (with the human’s proxy for
decisions).
Clearly, automation exists in various forms in civil aviation already. On-board
instrumentation and GPS automatically provide navigation; the control system au-
tomatically tracks the pilot’s commands; and the auto-pilot automatically guides the
aircraft to its next waypoint. These functions are not intelligent, but rather consist of
completely repetitive, pre-scripted responses that result in bounded and predictable
behavior.
While the above characteristics are amenable to certiﬁcation, they also con-
strain the performance and therefore the safety of the aircraft, because they prevent
the overall system from continuing to function as desired when it departs from its
nominal design conditions. Increasing adaptability, autonomy, and intelligence is
intended to enhance performance and safety by enabling desired functionality to be
maintained over a broader set of operating conditions.
1.1.3 Nondeterminism
One other term that we should deal with at the outset is nondeterminism. Adaptive
systems are sometimes characterized as being nondeterministic. Critics may do
this as a way to dismiss them as being impractical, unsafe, or impossible to certify.
However, this is an incorrect generalization. There can be nondeterministic aspects
to certain adaptive algorithms, but we need to be precise about the mechanism in-
volved and whether or not it impacts safety and certiﬁcation considerations.
There is no explicit requirement for determinism in current certiﬁcation stan-
dards. The only explicit mention of determinism found in DO-178B was a require-
ment in Section 12 that “only deterministic tools may be qualiﬁed; that is, tools
which produce the same output for the same input data when operating in the same
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environment.” However, determinism is certainly a desirable characteristic for ver-
iﬁcation, and is assumed in current standards and processes. We have identiﬁed the
following types of nondeterminism that may be relevant for our discussion:
Environmental nondeterminism— Most systems that take input from the outside
world and make decisions are inherently dealing with nondeterministic data:
we may be able to bound the input values and predict their behavior with
mathematical models, but we cannot know in advance all of the possible se-
quences of inputs. For example, any control system that includes an integrator
(e.g., a PID controller) may be considered nondeterministic at some level, be-
cause the internal state of the algorithm depends on its past inputs from the
environment. The internal state of the integrator may reach very different
values for very small changes in the input signals. Rigorous control design
techniques can ensure that these issues are not a concern in practice. How-
ever, other methods such as neural networks may not be able to guarantee
convergence or other desirable properties in the face of environmental nonde-
terminism.
Probabilistic algorithms— This includes algorithms that are based on sampling a
random process or probability distribution. Mathematical techniques to bound
the behavior of these algorithms and prove their convergence would be nec-
essary if they were to be used in a certiﬁed system.
Uncertain existence of solutions— The existence of a solution to a problem may
be unknown, or the algorithm may fail to ﬁnd a solution within a ﬁxed amount
of time. Many planning and optimization algorithms fall into this category.
For high-conﬁdence applications, they may be used in conjunction with alter-
native mechanisms to guarantee the existence of a viable (though suboptimal)
solution within a given deadline.
Concurrency— Multi-threaded computations where execution order impacts the
result can lead to nondeterministic outputs. Multi-threaded computations
should either be proven to be invariant to reordering, or synchronization mech-
anisms should be used to constraint the ordering as needed.
1.2 Background
The ﬁeld of adaptive control has matured over the last 50+ years, with important
contributions from a large number of researchers. Several different research pro-
grams were active in the 1990’s, including the AFRL Self-Designing Controller [84],
and the Boeing-led RESTORE [85] and JDAM [68] programs. These programs
culminated in successful ﬂight tests of indirect adaptive control on the NASA X-36
tailless aircraft, and multiple forms of adaptive augmentation on the JDAM missile
platform. More recently, the NASA DACS and IRAC projects developed various
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adaptive control methodologies to provide onboard control resilience in the face of
damage and other adverse ﬂight conditions [9, 24]. More details on these modern
research programs are provided in Appendix A.
As the core technologies for adaptive and intelligent ﬂight control have steadily
matured, focus has recently began to shift toward the topic of certiﬁcation [27, 74,
82]. At the same time, general interest in using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
has grown rapidly, extending beyond the military domain to countless applications
in the civil, scientiﬁc and commercial sectors. The autonomous operation of UAVs
will require intelligent methods to ensure safe and efﬁcient ﬂight, and so the topics
of autonomous and intelligent systems go hand in hand. Within the last year, mul-
tiple workshops have been sponsored by AFRL on the test, evaluation, veriﬁcation
and validation of autonomous systems [4], and the National Research Council has
issued a report on autonomy research for civil aviation [55].
All of the recent studies have underscored a few common points. It is widely
recognized that existing certiﬁcation criteria and processes do not properly account
for the unique characteristics of adaptive, intelligent methods. Non-determinism
and learning behavior are seen as presenting the greatest obstacles to certiﬁcation.
More speciﬁcally, the veriﬁcation and validation process is faced with technical
challenges, primarily due to the inherent difﬁculty in generating test-cases that pro-
vide full coverage.
In this report, our goal is to ﬁrst identify the unique characteristics present in
various types of adaptive control and AI methods, and then to examine why these
characteristics lead to certiﬁcation challenges. With this understanding in place, we
provide a set of potential new methods for certiﬁcation, and a suggested roadmap
for progressive implementation. Our study validates the ﬁndings of the FAA re-
port [82] conducted by Honeywell and NASA Langley, along with broadening the
scope of the adaptive systems considered to include a more detailed survey of AI
methods. Additionally, our report discusses the following new insights regarding
certiﬁcation of adaptive systems:
• We provide a mapping of the different adaptive methods to related certiﬁca-
tion challenges.
• We discuss the need for advanced veriﬁcation approaches for adaptive sys-
tems.
• We provide a mapping of the adaptive methods and respective potential appli-
cations to the associated software certiﬁcation level that may be required.
• We present a roadmap for adaptive technologies with categories deﬁning the
necessary changes in certiﬁcation processes.
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2 Motivating Applications
Technological advances in aviation, as with most applications, are driven by a few
fundamental goals: improve safety, enhance performance, and reduce cost. In pur-
suit of these ideals over the past century, the overall design of the airplane, its
systems, and how we regulate its ﬂight have experienced a signiﬁcant evolution.
Progress has been made on numerous fronts, including stronger and lighter mate-
rials, more efﬁcient engines, and enhanced aerodynamics. Advances in automatic
control, in particular, have vastly improved safety by ensuring the aircraft remains
stable and responsive to pilot commands in the face of atmospheric disturbances
and imperfect sensor measurements.
As the aviation industry continues to evolve today, many have recognized the
potential of adaptive and intelligent systems to further improve various aspects of
aircraft safety and performance. A 1994 FAA study on AI in aviation [27] cited
several areas that could potentially beneﬁt from the application of intelligent sys-
tems, including: support for emergency procedures, navigation, diversion planning,
diagnostics and monitoring. Another recent report written by NASA Langley and
Honeywell for the FAA [82] identiﬁed planning, monitoring, parameter estimation
and control reconﬁguration as important application areas for adaptive technolo-
gies.
Navigation 
Route-Planning 
Air-Traffic Management 
Offline System Design 

	 	

Flight Management 
Collision Avoidance 
Automatic Flight Control 
Supervisory Control 
Diagnostics 
Fault Detection 
Figure 2: Applications for adaptive and intelligent systems in civil aviation.
Figure 2 provides a broad summary of civil aviation applications that may ben-
eﬁt from adaptive and intelligent software. The application areas listed here are
grouped into ground-based and on-board applications. This is an important distinc-
tion with regards to certiﬁcation, as ground-based software is subjected to a unique
set of certiﬁcation guidance [36]. Applications that are completely ground-based in-
clude air trafﬁc management, which is administered by a network of ground-based
computer systems and personnel, as well as ofﬂine control system design. Appli-
8
cations that are completely on-board include those tasks that must occur immedi-
ately: automatic ﬂight control, ﬂight management, supervisory control, collision
avoidance, and fault detection. Other applications may be implemented on-board
or ofﬂoaded to a ground-based system as appropriate. This includes navigation,
route-planning, and diagnostics.
In the sections that follow, we discuss a few speciﬁc motivating applications
within civil aviation where the unique capabilities of adaptive and intelligent meth-
ods can provide important beneﬁts.
2.1 Post-Stall Upset Recovery
One of the most common dangers in civil aviation is the loss of control due to some
form of aircraft upset. This occurs when the aircraft enters into an extreme and
dangerous ﬂight condition, which could be the result of a system failure, extreme
turbulence, or pilot error. An example is when the aircraft stalls, a condition in
which the aerodynamic lift suddenly drops after the angle of attack grows too high.
Loss of control immediately follows, as the aerodynamic control surfaces lose their
effectiveness. Recovering from stall is a challenging task for pilots, particularly
because the aircraft is nearly unresponsive during stall, and then responds much
differently than normal at the onset of recovery. While conventional ﬂight con-
trol systems are designed to provide desired handling qualities and robust control
over the operational ﬂight envelope, they cannot cope with the highly nonlinear and
uncertain aerodynamic properties that occur at high angles of attack.
Adaptive control methods are well-suited for upset recovery. Rather than relying
on a static, pre-designed control law based on a poor model of the aerodynamics,
the adaptive control system changes dynamically based on the measured response,
effectively tuning itself. Various types of adaptive control have been ﬂight-tested on
the NASA AirSTAR sub-scale transport aircraft [9, 24]. Adaptive control methods
are discussed in Section 4.
2.2 Catastrophic Damage Landing
In the upset recovery example described above, the aircraft is only at risk while it
is ﬂying outside of the safe operating envelope. Once control is regained, routine
ﬂight may proceed. In the event of catastrophic damage or failure, however, the
aircraft remains in danger as long as it is in the air, and the goal is to reach a safe
landing as quickly as possible.
A prime example of catastrophic damage landing occurred in January of 2009,
when US Airways Flight 1549 struck a ﬂock of geese, lost both of its twin jet en-
gines, and landed safely in the Hudson River. In this case, the successful landing
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was attributed to a well-trained and experienced pilot who recognized the safest
possible location to land. With both engines out, the aircraft was far less maneuver-
able but it remained stable and provided sufﬁcient control authority for the pilot to
turn and manage the rate of descent.
In more extreme damage events, such as the partial loss of a wing, or other se-
vere structural damage, the aircraft dynamics can change radically. In cases like
these, the aerodynamic properties resulting from the damage can be highly non-
linear and extremely difﬁcult to model. Even if a precise model could be made for
each damage event, this approach is impractical due to the sheer number of different
models that would be required, as well as the challenge of identifying in real-time
which model is the correct one to use. Therefore, a control system that can auto-
matically adapt to the abrupt change in dynamics may be the only way to restore
control and save the aircraft.
Rockwell Collins Control Technologies has developed an automatic supervisory
adaptive control architecture to enable this type of damage tolerant control [39].
2.3 Autonomous Operation of UAVs
Operation of remotely piloted vehicles by hobbyists, universities, and businesses
has soared over the last several years. Quad rotors in particular have become a
popular platform for may applications due in part to their relative ease of operation
and their ability to hover and roam at low speed. Current FAA regulations severely
restrict the use of unmanned vehicles in controlled airspace, but the inherent market
incentives for using them will likely lead to a relaxation of these rules. As an exam-
ple, both Amazon and Google have recently announced their plans to use unmanned
“drones” for automated package delivery. Although the reality of these visions may
still lie far into the future, they do give evidence to the potential economic beneﬁts
of UAVs.
If autonomous aerial vehicles are to be integrated safely into the airspace, sev-
eral technical and regulatory challenges must be worked out. Both visual ﬂight rules
(VFR) and instrument ﬂight rules (IFR) govern the appropriate actions of pilots in
different classes of airspace. One of the key responsibilities of a pilot is to see and
avoid other aircraft, ensuring that they do not endanger their safe ﬂight. The same
rules will extend to the autonomous control system ﬂying the UAV. Therefore, on-
board hardware and software enabling a “see and avoid” capability is likely to be a
requirement for UAVs operating in regulated airspace.
Of the many potential applications, agricultural monitoring appears to be the
most attractive place to start. There are clear market incentives for farmers, who
could use light UAVs as a low-cost tool for quickly monitoring crop health over
a large area. In addition, ﬂying over private property in unpopulated rural areas
10
has added beneﬁts, eliminating privacy issues and reducing the safety implications.
One remaining concern is the need to bound the ﬂight of the UAV over a designated
area. The concept of “geo-fencing” has been used on remotely piloted vehicles for
automatic ﬂight termination, and is a candidate solution to safely bound the ﬂight
of autonomous UAVs. Extending autonomous ﬂights into urban areas is of course
another major area of interest due to the broader market potential, but it introduces
more challenges. In particular, safe landing paths must be identiﬁed ahead of time
to ensure vehicles can safely terminate ﬂight from any point in their trajectory [54].
11
3 Certiﬁcation Overview
In this section we provide an overview of the current certiﬁcation process for civil
aircraft. As we later consider the characteristics of adaptive and intelligent algo-
rithms, this will provide the background for understanding the challenges that the
certiﬁcation process might present for deployment of these algorithms.
Certiﬁcation is deﬁned in [53] as follows:
Certiﬁcation: Legal recognition by the certiﬁcation authority that a product,
service, organization or person complies with the requirements. Such certi-
ﬁcation comprises the activity of technically checking the product, service,
organization or person and the formal recognition of compliance with the
applicable requirements by issue of a certiﬁcate, license, approval or other
documents as required by national laws and procedures.
The requirements referred to in this deﬁnition are the government regulations
regarding the airworthiness of aircraft in the NAS. Note that software itself is not
certiﬁed in isolation, but only as part of an aircraft.
This deﬁnition goes on to say that certiﬁcation of a product (i.e., an airplane)
involves: (a) the process of assessing the design of a product to ensure that it com-
plies with a set of standards applicable to that type of product so as to demonstrate
an acceptable level of safety; (b) the process of assessing an individual product to
ensure that it conforms with the certiﬁed type design; (c) the issuance of a certiﬁ-
cate required by national laws to declare that compliance or conformity has been
found with standards in accordance with items (a) or (b) above.
In the context of commercial aircraft, type certiﬁcation is legal recognition by
the relevant certiﬁcation authority (the FAA in the U.S. or EASA in Europe) that an
aircraft design complies with speciﬁed governmental regulations. In practice, cer-
tiﬁcation consists primarily of convincing representatives of a government agency
that all required steps have been taken to ensure the safety, reliability, and integrity
of the aircraft.
Certiﬁcation differs from veriﬁcation in that it focuses on evidence provided
to a third party to demonstrate that the required activities were performed com-
pletely and correctly, rather on performance of the activities themselves. Also note
that certiﬁcation connects a product or design to legal requirements for its safety.
Therefore, it is possible for a design to be safe but not certiﬁable if it is not possible
to produce the type of evidence required by the certiﬁcation process or if the certi-
ﬁcation authority is for some reason not convinced of the adequacy of the evidence
provided.
Military aircraft fall under an entirely different legal framework. Civil aircraft
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certiﬁcation differs signiﬁcantly from military airworthiness certiﬁcation due to
differences in public safety expectations, operational requirements, and procure-
ment processes. Airworthiness of military aircraft is deﬁned in MIL-HDBK-516B.
Military aircraft certiﬁcation is part of the procurement process, since the military
branch that is buying the aircraft is also responsible for certifying its airworthiness
as part of accepting the product. This partially explains why some adaptive and
intelligent algorithms have been deployed in military aircraft for many years, but
not commercial aircraft.
3.1 Airworthiness Requirements
In the U.S., the legal requirements for aircraft operating in the NAS are deﬁned in
the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 14 (14CFR), Aeronautics and Space. The
purpose of certiﬁcation is to ensure that these legal requirements have been met.
Airworthiness standards for transport class aircraft are speciﬁed in Part 25 and
standards for smaller aircraft are speciﬁed in Part 23. Parts 27 and 29 apply to
rotorcraft and Part 33 to engines. Part 25 covers topics including Flight, Struc-
ture, Design and Construction, Powerplant, Equipment, Operating Limitations, and
Electrical Wiring. Some of the requirements are quite detailed. For example, Sub-
part B (Flight) provides formulas and a detailed procedure for computing reference
stall speed. It also provides requirements for controllability, trim conditions, and
stability. Subpart D (Design and Construction) includes requirements for Control
Systems related to stability augmentation, trim systems, and limit load static tests.
Some requirements cover items that no longer apply to modern aircraft (cables and
pulleys).
The important observation here is that any changes to the certiﬁcation process
that we may eventually want to consider to facilitate deployment of adaptive or
intelligent systems must still ensure compliance with 14CFR. A detailed review of
these requirements will be necessary to be sure that there are no legal barriers to
deployment of adaptive or intelligent systems, in addition to any barriers related to
the current certiﬁcation process.
3.2 Certiﬁcation Process
The stakeholders in the civil aviation domain (FAA, airframers, equipment manu-
facturers) have developed a collection of documents deﬁning a certiﬁcation process
which has been accepted as the standard means to comply with federal regulations.
The process includes system development, safety assessment, and design assurance.
These documents and their relationships are shown in Figure 3.
13
Figure 3: Relationship among key documents in the certiﬁcation process
The intended function, or requirements, for a new aircraft are the starting point
for the process. These requirements are the basis for the aircraft system design
that is produced in accordance with ARP4754A, the guidelines for the system de-
velopment process. The system design along with the aircraft requirements and
its operating context are used to conduct a safety assessment in accordance with
ARP4761.
The safety assessment determines, among other things, the criticality of sys-
tem components as they contribute to the safety of the overall system. The system
development process allocates functions and requirements to hardware and soft-
ware components in the system, along with their assigned criticality from the safety
assessment process. This information is used to develop the individual compo-
nents and functions. The design assurance documents DO-178C (for software),
DO-254 (for programmable hardware), and DO-297 (for integrated modular avion-
ics) provide guidance for ensuring that these components satisfy the requirements
that come from the system development process.
3.3 Safety Assessment
Safety assessment is performed in accordance with ARP4761, Guidelines andMeth-
ods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on Civil Airborne Systems and
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Equipment. This document describes guidelines and methods of performing the
safety assessment for certiﬁcation of civil aircraft, and is a means of showing com-
pliance with the safety requirements of 14CFR. These requirements are hidden in
Subpart F (Equipment) section 25.1309 with the unlikely title “Equipment, systems,
and installations.”
This section states that the equipment, systems, and installations required in an
aircraft must be designed to ensure that they perform their intended functions under
any foreseeable operating condition. The airplane systems and associated compo-
nents, considered separately and in relation to other systems, must be designed so
that:
• The occurrence of any failure condition which would prevent the continued
safe ﬂight and landing of the airplane is extremely improbable, and
• The occurrence of any other failure conditions which would reduce the capa-
bility of the airplane or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating
conditions is improbable.
The section goes on to state that warning information must be provided to alert
the crew to unsafe system operating conditions, and that systems, controls, and as-
sociated monitoring and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors
which could create additional hazards. Compliance must be shown by analysis or
testing that considers possible modes of failure (including malfunctions and damage
from external sources), the probability of multiple failures and undetected failures,
the resulting effects on the airplane and occupants, and the crew warning cues, cor-
rective action required, and the capability of detecting faults.
It should be obvious, but it is worth emphasizing that any aircraft design that
contains adaptive or intelligent systems will include a safety assessment that iden-
tiﬁes requirements for those systems and determines how they must function to
provide for safe operation of the aircraft. This must include the ability to function
in the presence of failures, and without creating conditions that could cause crew
errors and introduce additional hazards. Any system that cannot provide the func-
tionality required by the safety analysis must not be deployed in a civil aircraft, and
barriers to certiﬁcation in this instance are appropriate.
3.4 System Development
Aircraft system development is described in ARP4754A, “Guidelines for Develop-
ment of Civil Aircraft and Systems.” This document discusses the development of
aircraft systems, taking into account the overall aircraft operating environment and
functions. This includes validation of requirements and veriﬁcation of the design
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implementation for certiﬁcation and product assurance. It provides practices for
showing compliance with the regulations.
ARP4754A provides guidance for creating plans for the system development,
and eight integral processes which span all of the system development activities.
These include safety assessment, assurance level assignment, requirements cap-
ture, requirements validation, implementation veriﬁcation, conﬁguration manage-
ment, process assurance, and certiﬁcation and regulatory authority coordination.
The system development process allocates functionality and deﬁnes requirements
for components, both hardware and software. It invokes the safety assessment pro-
cess ensures that the system design satisﬁes safety requirements for the aircraft,
and guides developers in allocating system requirements to hardware and software
components and in determining the criticality level for those components.
An adaptive or intelligent system needs to be able to provide the level of safety
required by the system design. It must be deﬁned in terms of a complete set of
system-level requirements that can be implemented and veriﬁed by the software
assurance process.
3.5 Software Assurance
The software assurance process makes sure that components are developed and ver-
iﬁed to meet their requirements without any unintended functionality. This means
that the process will include activities speciﬁcally designed to provide evidence that
the software does only what its requirements specify, and nothing else.
For software in commercial aircraft, the relevant guidance is found in DO-178C,
“Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment Certiﬁcation.” Cer-
tiﬁcation authorities in North American and Europe have agreed that an applicant
(aircraft manufacturer) can use this guidance as a means of compliance with the
regulations governing aircraft certiﬁcation.
The original version of the document, DO-178, was approved in 1982 and con-
sisted largely of a description of best practices for software development. It was re-
vised in 1985 as DO-178A, adding deﬁnitions of three levels of software criticality,
with development and veriﬁcation processes described in more detail. DO-178B,
approved in 1992, deﬁned ﬁve levels of software criticality (A – E) with speciﬁc
objectives, activities, and evidence required for each level. The processes and ob-
jectives in the document assume a traditional development process with test-based
veriﬁcation.
In 2005, the publishers of DO-178 initiated work on a revision to be known as
DO-178C. A committee was chartered to draft the new document, with the objec-
tives of minimizing changes to the core document, yet updating it to accommodate
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approximately 15 years of progress in software engineering. Guidance speciﬁc to
new software technologies was to be contained in supplements which could add,
modify, or replace objectives in the core document. New supplements were de-
veloped in the areas of object oriented design, model-based development, and for-
mal methods, as well as an additional document containing new guidance on tool
qualiﬁcation. DO-178C and its associated documents were published in 2011 and
accepted by the FAA as a means of compliance in 2013.
As a consequence if its latest revisions, DO-178C makes greater allowance for,
and emphasis on, using analysis and model-based development techniques for soft-
ware development. This should help with certiﬁcation of aircraft that include adap-
tive and intelligent software algorithms.
3.5.1 Software Development
DO-178C does not prescribe a speciﬁc development process, but instead identiﬁes
important activities and design considerations throughout a development process,
and deﬁnes objectives for each of these activities. It assumes a traditional develop-
ment process that can be decomposed as follows:
• Software Requirements Process. Develops High Level Requirements (HLR)
from the output of the system design process.
• Software Design Process. Develops Low Level Requirements (LLR) and
Software Architecture from the HLR.
• Software Coding Process. Develops source code from the software architec-
ture and the LLR.
• Software Integration Process. Combines executable object code modules with
the target hardware for hardware/software integration.
Each of these processes produces or updates a collection of lifecycle data items,
culminating in an integrated executable.
3.5.2 Software Veriﬁcation
The results of these processes are veriﬁed through the veriﬁcation process. The
veriﬁcation process consists of review, analysis, and test activities that must provide
evidence of the correctness of the development activities.
In general, veriﬁcation has two complementary objectives. One objective is
to demonstrate that the software satisﬁes its requirements. The second objective
is to demonstrate with a high degree of conﬁdence that errors which could lead
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to unacceptable failure conditions, as determined by the system safety assessment
process, have been removed.
One of the foundational principles of DO-178C is requirements-based testing.
This means that the veriﬁcation activities are centered around explicit demonstra-
tion that each requirement has been met.
A second principle is complete coverage, both of the requirements and of the
code that implements them. This means that every requirement and every line of
code will be examined in the veriﬁcation process. Furthermore, several metrics are
deﬁned which specify the degree of coverage that must be obtained in the veriﬁca-
tion process, depending on the criticality of the software being veriﬁed.
A third principle is traceability among all of the life cycle data items produced
in the development process. This means that:
• Every requirement must have one or more associated test cases. All testing
must trace to a speciﬁc requirement.
• Every requirement must be traceable to code that implements it. Every line of
code must be traceable to a requirement.
• Every line of code (and, in some cases, every branch and condition in the
code) must be exercised by a test case.
Together, these objectives provide evidence that all requirements are correctly
implemented and that no unintended function has been implemented. Note that
the Formal Methods Supplement (DO-333) generally allows the testing described
above to be replaced by a comparable formal analysis. However, even when formal
methods are used some on-target testing is required.
One constraint imposed by ARP4754A (and DO-178C) is that requirements
must be veriﬁable, which in the past has meant testable. This meant that in practice
there could be no negative requirements such those related to safety (e.g., the system
can never enter an unsafe state). However, such requirements can be addressed
analytically and may be very useful in demonstrating the safety of an adaptive or
intelligent algorithm.
In summary, under the current standards, any adaptive or intelligent system will
need to have explicit, veriﬁable requirements that completely specify its behavior,
and for which every line of the code implementing it can be traced back to those
requirements through an appropriate coverage metric.
3.6 Example Certiﬁed Control Application
To give an example of how requirements are presently deﬁned for existing con-
trol systems, this section describes the requirements for a typical certiﬁed autopilot
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system. The following are the requirements listed:
• Identify all the system inputs from other systems or subsystems: Roll, Pitch,
Airspeed, Pilot Commands, Aileron commands.
• Evaluate validity of the system by monitoring Autopilot data: Identify condi-
tions under which the Autopilot is invalid.
• Indicate how the system is activated: Identify the signal/condition that leads
to activating the system.
• Resolve conﬂict about which Flight Guidance System is in control: Identify
command source, Roll command data, Pitch command data.
• How to engage and disengage the autopilot: How does the pilot do it.
• Copilot trying to override autopilot on ground.
• Takeoff with Autopilot engaged.
• Autopilot Engagement: Conditions when the autopilot is engaged.
• Autopilot Disengagement: Conditions when the autopilot is disengaged.
• Autopilot fail: Indicate autopilot failed when the identiﬁed conditions are met.
• Autopilot monitor: Trigger the monitor when performance is outside the en-
velope.
• Autopilot Limiter/ Interface function: Autopilot controllers designed to inter-
face with the Flight Guidance system and the Autoland systems. It provides
the required attitude roll and pitch.
• Autopilot Pitch Interface:
– Pitch Interface shall control aircraft pitch attitude in response to the pitch
command input.
– Autopilot pitch damping: The requirement is to meet a narrow ﬁxed
control bandwidth, by applying damping on the error signal.
– Autopilot Pitch Command Selection and Limiting: The autopilot re-
sponse must be relatively stable and robust to variation of other com-
ponents it interacts with. Autopilot response must meet acceptable ride
quality and passenger comfort characteristics. Transition characteristics
between engaging and disengaging the Autopilot should be smooth and
limited small signal oscillatory modes that result from non-linear ele-
ments in the aircraft control systems.
– Autopilot pitch forward gain: Control response changes in response to
airspeed and aircraft control conﬁguration. The requirement is to meet
a narrow ﬁxed control bandwidth by applying forward gain on the error
signal.
– Autopilot Pitch Command Fade: Autopilot shall fade command when
conditions are met about selection of the pitch.
– Autopilot pitch performance: The autopilot performance requirements
are based on achieving a desired aircraft response to step inputs that
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ensure that the control bandwidth and accuracy of the pitch attitude con-
troller is sufﬁcient to support the outer loop control performance require-
ments.
• Autopilot Roll Interface:
– Roll Interface shall control aircraft roll attitude in response to the roll
command input.
– Autopilot roll damping: The requirement is to meet a narrow ﬁxed con-
trol bandwidth, by applying damping on the error signal.
– Autopilot Pitch Command Selection and Limiting: The autopilot re-
sponse must be relatively stable and robust to variation of other com-
ponents it interacts with. Autopilot response must meet acceptable ride
quality and passenger comfort characteristics. Transition characteristics
between engaging and disengaging the Autopilot should be smooth and
limited small signal oscillatory modes that result from non-linear ele-
ments in the aircraft control systems.
– Autopilot roll forward gain: Control response changes in response to
airspeed and aircraft control conﬁguration. The requirement is to meet
a narrow ﬁxed control bandwidth by applying forward gain on the error
signal.
– Autopilot roll performance: The autopilot performance requirements are
based on achieving a desired aircraft response to step inputs that ensure
that the control bandwidth and accuracy of the roll attitude controller is
sufﬁcient to support the outer loop control performance requirements.
Amount of roll, prevent oscillation.
• Autopilot Pitch Command Fade: Autopilot shall fade command when condi-
tions are met about selection of the pitch.
• Autopilot output signals.
This list indicates the activities and requirements in a typical control application.
The most important activity is establishing the requirements, as the designed system
needs to be traced back to these requirements. These requirements, are to some
extent, linked to the safety analysis for the system. Some requirements are linked
to airworthiness requirements in 14CFR. However, many are based on experience
and best practices, drawing on the expertise of control engineers. Adaptive and
intelligent software can be certiﬁed in the same way as long as we can come up
with a convincing set of requirements to be implemented and veriﬁed.
Many of the adaptive and intelligent algorithms that we might consider for near-
term deployment in civil aircraft are not substantively different from avionics sys-
tems. They consist of software that implements some mathematical algorithm run-
ning on standard computing hardware. For these algorithms, the main questions
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will be:
• Can we deﬁne a complete set of requirements that describes the function of
the system and behavior that is necessary to ensure the safety of the aircraft?
• Can we accomplish a complete veriﬁcation of the system, showing that in all
scenarios it satisﬁes its requirements with no unintended behaviors?
In the following sections we will examine a number of speciﬁc algorithms with
respect to these and other potential barriers to certiﬁcation.
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4 Adaptive Control Algorithms
4.1 Introduction
Feedback control laws are designed to ensure stability, reject disturbances, and im-
prove speciﬁc response characteristics of a dynamic system. If the dynamics of the
system are well-known and the disturbances well-understood, then a single control
policy may be designed that is robust to all possible variations in the system dy-
namics. On the other hand, if the system carries signiﬁcant uncertainty or spans a
large range of dynamic behavior, then the potential variations in the model may be
so large as to prevent a single robust control policy. In this case, it is necessary that
the control system be adaptive to changes that emerge in the system.
A concise deﬁnition of an adaptive controller, according to Astrom and Wit-
tenmark [5], is simply one “with adjustable parameters and some mechanism for
adjusting the parameters.” This includes the traditional approach of gain-scheduled
control which has been used in commercial aviation for decades. With gain-scheduled
control, multiple control policies are designed a priori at speciﬁc points within a
multi-dimensional operating space. For aircraft, this space is called the ﬂight en-
velope. Based on the aircraft’s ﬂight condition within this envelope, an appropriate
set of control parameters (or gains) is selected from the pre-designed set of control
policies.
In general, adaptive control methods can be implemented either directly or in-
directly. With Indirect Adaptive Control, the plant parameters are estimated online
and the controller is then synthesized from the estimated plant model. In contrast,
with Direct Adaptive Control, the estimated parameters are used directly in the con-
troller.
An overview of key adaptive control concepts and methods is given below:
Adaptation Law — All adaptive control methods require some form of online pa-
rameter estimation. This is the adaptive part of adaptive control, sometimes
referred to as the adaptation law. Various methods, including some AI-based
techniques, may be used to perform this step, and their performance has im-
portant implications on the stability and robustness of the closed-loop system.
Several different types of adaptation laws have been developed by various re-
searchers over the years. Several widely used adaptation laws are summarized
below: [5, 34]
• Gradient Based. This is also known as the MIT Rule. Here, a cost func-
tion is deﬁned based on the error, and the adaptation law is derived by
setting the time-derivative of the control parameter to be proportional to
the negative gradient of the cost function. This ultimately yields an ex-
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pression for the time-derivative of the control parameter that is a function
of both the error signal and the sensitivity derivative. The proportional
constant γ is a design parameter called the adaptive gain. The MIT rule,
though widely used, does not ensure convergence and its performance is
often very sensitive to the selection of γ.
• Least-Squares Based. Here, the plant is modeled as a linear combination
of set functions, and the coefﬁcients are chosen to minimize the sum of
the squares of the components of the error signal. Performance is sen-
sitive to the model structure. Using too few parameters will not provide
a good ﬁt to the data. However, using too many parameters can result
in overﬁtting, where the model matches the measured data points very
well, but is a poor model for other data sets.
• Lyapunov Based. The adaptation law here is based on a Lyapunov func-
tion of the error and state signals which is designed to give bounded
asymptotic convergence of the control parameters. Lyapunov methods
with projection operators have been used recently in L1 adaptive control
to provide guaranteed robustness properties with fast estimation (high
adaptive gain) [23, 31].
Persistent Excitation - In many parameter estimation schemes, guaranteeing con-
vergence requires persistent excitation (PE) of the control signal. In recursive
designs, the tracking error signal may reach zero before the learning/estimation
ﬁlter is able to converge. This is not a fundamental problem, but can lead
to poor transient behavior until the parameter estimation converges. Non-
recursive designs, although always convergent by deﬁnition, are still sensitive
to the control signal excitation. In a weighted least squares method, for ex-
ample, the estimation requires a matrix inversion where the matrix is only
invertible (full-rank) if the control inputs span a set of linear independent vec-
tors over the sampling period. In both cases, adding a PE signal to the control
signal can ensure convergence, but will, in turn, lead to poor steady-state per-
formance [35]. For civil aviation, introducing PE would signiﬁcantly impact
pilot handling qualities and ride comfort. For this reason, estimation methods
that do not require PE are generally preferred.
Certainty Equivalence - Most adaptive control designs are based on the certainty
equivalence principle. In general, the gains of the adaptive controller are de-
rived from a set of uncertain parameters whose true values are not known. Us-
ing the certainty equivalence principle, the estimates of these parameters are
treated as if they were the true parameters. This requires sufﬁciently fast pa-
rameter convergence in order for the adaptive controller to exhibit the desired
performance characteristics. If certainty equivalence is not used, the design is
referred to as cautious. In this case, the uncertainty is modeled explicitly in
the parameter estimates [34, 86].
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Self-Tuning Regulator (STR) - This is one of the earliest terms used for adap-
tive control [5]. The term “self-tuning” refers to the property that the control
parameters converge to the values that would be designed explicitly if the
uncertain process were known. This is now referred to as the certainty equiv-
alence principle, discussed above. The term “regulator” refers to the control
structure, which attempts to regulate the state of the plant to a set point. Such
a structure does not include a reference model [5].
Model Reference Adaptive Control (MRAC) - Here, a reference model is used
to deﬁne the desired response of the system given a command input. Us-
ing the error between the observed plant output and the desired response, the
adaptation mechanism computes the control parameters (either directly or in-
directly) to drive that error to zero.
Model Identiﬁcation Adaptive Control (MIAC) - This is a form of indirect adap-
tive control. The parameter estimation step is used to compute uncertain parts
of the plant model. The control parameters are then computed in a separate
step, based on the estimated plant model [82].
Adaptive Feedforward Control / Compensation - A non-adaptive controller is
augmented with an adaptive feedforward ﬁlter, modifying the control signal to
achieve desired closed-loop properties. This is also known as Adaptive Aug-
mentation. This approach is typically used to improve disturbance rejection
when the nominal plant is well known, but the disturbances can be large and
uncertain.
L1 Adaptive Control - Application of a relatively new L1 control design method-
ology enables the robustness properties of the system to be decoupled from
the adaptation rate, enabling fast adaption with guaranteed robustness.
Adaptive Pole Placement Control - Here, the control parameters are computed
to place the closed-loop system poles to give desired dynamics. It has been
shown that MRAC is a special case of Adaptive Pole Placement Control [34]
Adaptive Augmentation - A non-adaptive baseline control law is used to provide
tracking and robustness properties for the nominal system. An adaptive ele-
ment is added to augment the baseline controller by estimating some measure
of the plant uncertainty and driving the residual tracking error to zero. This
is often implemented with an adaptive feed-forward ﬁlter to improve distur-
bance rejection when the nominal plant is well known, but the disturbances
can be large and uncertain. Adaptive augmentation in general is a popular ar-
chitectural approach that has been used by a variety of researchers on several
different aircraft and missile systems [9, 24, 57, 76, 77].
Adaptive Dynamic Inversion (ADI) - Dynamic Inversion (DI) applies a fast in-
ner loop control that inverts the dynamics, forcing the nonlinear system to
exhibit a desired (linear) response to reference commands. Some form of an
adaptive outer loop is added in order to compensate for the nonlinear inversion
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errors. [31, 45, 50].
Stochastic Adaptive Control - Here, the process and environment are described
with a stochastic model. The control law objective is to minimize the ex-
pected value of a loss function. This is also referred to as dual control, as it
requires a balance of minimizing the tracking error as well as estimation er-
rors. The problem may be solved numerically using dynamic programming,
but solutions do not scale well and are therefore practically limited to rela-
tively simple models [5, 86].
4.1.1 Adaptive Control Structures
In the sections that follow, we provide a brief discussion of different control system
structures, and point out how various forms of adaptive control differ from one
another. In the diagrams that follow, the “System” block represents the aircraft
dynamic system, or plant, that is being controlled. The system response is fed back
to the “Controller” block, which computes the control signals to drive the system
according the command signal from the pilot. In each diagram, a different type of
Adaptation Method is shown. The output of the adaptation method in each case is
an updated set of control parameters that are provided to the Controller block. 1
4.2 Gain Scheduled Control
A traditional feedback control structure with gain-scheduling is shown in Figure 4.
With gain-scheduling, the adaptation method is a simple table lookup. The full
ﬂight envelope of the aircraft is typically characterized by a range of altitudes and
Mach numbers, though additional parameters may also be used, such as dynamic
pressure and rate of climb. In practice, this multi-dimensional space is discretized
into a grid of distinct ﬂight conditions, and a unique set of controller gains are
designed for each grid point. As the aircraft state gradually moves around within
the ﬂight envelope, the pre-computed gains for the nearest set of ﬂight conditions
are used to determine the appropriate gain values at the current ﬂight condition. This
operation is typically done using a table lookup with interpolation. This methods is
widely used and certiﬁed.
But it still has issues
No performance guarantees in between design points.
1The control parameter update is shown using standard notation in adaptive control, with a diagonal arrow
crossing the Controller block.
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Impractical to capture all possible model variations with a ﬁnite set of grid points.
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Figure 4: Feedback Control with Gain Scheduling
4.3 Indirect Adaptive Control
A block diagram for indirect adaptive control (IAC) is shown in Figure 5. This is
also sometimes referred to as a model identiﬁcation adaptive control (MIAC) [82].
Here, the control signals and measured response of the system are ﬁrst used to per-
form system identiﬁcation; this is where the online parameter estimation occurs. In
a MIAC structure, the estimated parameters describe the system. Using the updated
model of the system, a separate control design step computes the new controller
gains that provide the desired performance characteristics for it.
As the diagrams in Figure 4 and Figure 5 clearly point out, the main difference
between gain scheduled and adaptive control is that in the adaptive system, the
controller design step is automated. An obvious advantage of the adaptive system,
therefore, is that it removes the burden of having to design and store a large set
of control gains. Rather than pre-computing several “point-design” controllers at
discrete ﬂight conditions, the appropriate gains are instead computed automatically
for the updated system model, based on some chosen control synthesis procedure
(e.g. pole placement, LQR, or H∞). In this context, adaptive systems can be (and
have been) adopted to facilitate ofﬂine development of control designs [82].
In order for the adaptive system to provide the desired performance characteris-
tics, the parameter estimation step must converge sufﬁciently fast. The consequence
of slow convergence is poor transient behavior, as the controller is essentially trying
to compensate for the wrong dynamics while parameter estimates are converging to
the correct values. This is a common challenge for all adaptive systems.
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Figure 5: Indirect Adaptive Control (IAC) / Model Identiﬁcation Adaptive Control
(MIAC)
Key Characteristics:
Convergence rate For indirect/identiﬁcation methods parameter convergence is
more complicated as the correct value to which it converges to keeps changing
as the system identiﬁcation continues to identify the model. Thus the rate is
unpredictable. Additionally, presence of noise or inadequate excitation signal
may make convergence slower.
High frequency dynamics A large adaptive gain has the potential to lead to high-
frequency oscillations which can excite the unmodeled dynamics that could
adversely affect robustness/stability of an adaptive control law [73]
Persistent Excitation The error goes to zero but the parameters do not necessar-
ily converge to their correct values. The input signal must have properties
for parameters to converge. For convergence to occur the input signal to the
process should be sufﬁciently exciting and the structure of the model should
be compatible with the process.
Transient effects Choices of underlying design methodology that leads to oscil-
lation or ringing should be avoided. Also, initial transients depends upon the
initial values of the estimator. These characteristics vary based on the algo-
rithm used for parameter adjustment and the amount of excitation.
4.4 Direct Model Reference Adaptive Control
Figure 6 shows a direct form of model reference adaptive control (MRAC). The
command input is supplied to a reference model, which represents the desired dy-
namic behavior of the system. The output of this reference model is the desired
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response, which is compared to the actual measured response of the system to give
the error. If the controller is tuned correctly, it will produce control signals that
drive the error to zero. However, the presence of uncertainty in the system prevents
us from knowing how to tune the controller a priori. The adaptation method for a
direct MRAC is to estimate the system uncertainty parameters and use those param-
eters directly in the control law to cancel the error. When the estimated uncertainty
parameters converge to their true values, the error is canceled completely.
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Figure 6: Direct Model Reference Adaptive Control (MRAC)
In general, the performance of an MRAC system is improved with a higher
adaptive gain. If the adaptive gain is too small, the parameter estimation loop is
too slow to converge, and the adaptive control is simply incapable of tracking the
faster dynamics. Increasing the adaptive gain enables the parameter estimation to
converge faster, reducing the tracking error and giving a better transient response.
However, if the adaptation gain is too high in a traditional MRAC architecture, it
leads to high-gain feedback which can cause undesirable oscillations or even in-
stability. [84]. This tradeoff between robustness and transient performance is a
fundamental design challenge with adaptive control. Rockwell Collins, Automatic
Supervisory Adaptive Control (ASAC) [39] provides an example of adaptive algo-
rithm, which gets enabled only in off-nominal conditions. In the speciﬁc case of
adapting to a wing loss, ASAC tracks aileron trim offset, which normally should
be very close to neutral (zero). When trim exceeds a certain threshold, then ASAC
employs a PI control law, which commands a sideslip angle to offset the aileron
trim. When aircraft is not damaged, ASAC output is zero. When damage occurs, it
does the right thing by design, without caring what kind of damage occurred.
Key Characteristics:
Convergence rate Parameters converge to the correct value based on the reference
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model either gradually or rapidly. This rate of convergence depends upon the
value of gain. For low values of gain the rate increases with gain but for higher
values of gain the behavior is unpredictable.
High frequency dynamics Faster convergence requires a large adaptive gain which
has the potential to lead to high-frequency oscillations which can excite the
unmodeled dynamics that could adversely affect robustness/stability of an
adaptive control law [73]
Lack of parameter convergence The error goes to zero but the parameters do not
necessarily converge to their correct values. The input signal must have prop-
erties for parameters to converge.
4.5 L1 Adaptive Control
A relatively new methodology called “L1 adaptive control” (or L1AC) was intro-
duced in 2006 to address the challenge of simultaneously achieving both desired
transient performance and guaranteed robustness properties [11, 12]. The L1AC
approach was initially developed from a conventional MRAC architecture. One
representation (though not representative of every possible architecture) of L1AC
is shown in Figure 7. Comparing this to the MRAC diagram, the two main architec-
tural differences with L1AC can be seen clearly. Namely, a low-pass ﬁlter is applied
to the control output, and the estimated control parameters are fed to the reference
model, making it a state predictor.
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Figure 7: L1AC - L1 Adaptive Control Structure
The authors of L1AC point out that the main distinction fromMRAC is the prob-
lem formulation, which seeks to determine a control law that ensures: 1) predictable
transient performance for all t ≥ 0, and 2) a bounded control signal that does not
exceed the control system bandwidth. The key to achieving these objectives is to
synthesize an appropriate control architecture that decouples the estimation loop
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from the control loop. In some cases, this can be achieved with minimal deviation
from the conventional MRAC architecture, for example, by just inserting a low-pass
ﬁlter on the controller output. In particular, this approach is shown to be satisfac-
tory for systems that have known input gain [32]. For systems with unknown input
gain, the control law must take on a slightly different form to provide the necessary
decoupling between the estimation and control loops.
With the decoupling of estimation and control provided by the L1AC scheme,
the adaptive gain can be increased to improve transient performance without intro-
ducing high-gain feedback in the control channel. In this sense, the adaptive gain
may be increased arbitrarily; theoretically, it is only limited by the processing capa-
bility of the computer hardware implementing the ﬁlter. For a conventional MRAC,
the time-delay margin of the closed-loop system vanishes to zero as the adaptive
gain is increased. In contrast, the time-delay margin for L1AC remains bounded
away from zero, guaranteeing a certain level of robust stability. The usual design
tradeoff between performance and robustness is still present in L1AC, but it is no
longer sensitive to the rate of adaptation. Instead, the performance / robustness
tradeoff is isolated in the selection of the control ﬁltering structure, which may be
designed using traditional control design methodologies.
Notably, L1AC methods have been used successfully on several ﬂight tests of
the NASA subscale Generic Transport Model (GTM) [9, 23, 24]. These ﬂights
were conducted to support test and evaluation of control laws beyond the edge of
the normal ﬂight envelope, such as post-stall, high-alpha conditions, where there
is signiﬁcant nonlinearity and uncertainty in the aerodynamic model. L1 adap-
tive can be utilized for online tuning of gain schedules. Imagine an experimental
software load, which runs a ﬁxed control law with conﬁgurable parameters, where
parameters are changed in real-time by L1 adaptive algorithm, running on another
processor. The processor running the control law can impose restrictions on param-
eter changes, rate of change of parameters, etc, to make it safe. Once gain tuning
has been accomplished throughout the ﬂight envelope and a set of aircraft conﬁgu-
rations covered by intended type certiﬁcation, the schedules are frozen, and loaded
into the autopilot computer memory. Again, this does not require any changes to
current cert process. This method can be used when plant models are either un-
available, or so poor that the ofﬂine optimization is not tenable.
Key Characteristics:
Computational demands The L1-adaptive control method seeks to decouple the
estimation loop from the control loop, enabling the adaptive gain to be arbi-
trarily high. However, the large adaptive gain leads to high bandwidth chan-
nels in the estimation loop which requires fast processing. This can potentially
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place unrealistically high demands on the computer hardware.
4.6 Adaptive control with Neural Networks
The adaptation method for indirect adaptive control architectures can be executed
with a neural network [49]. Neural networks (NN), which are discussed in Sec-
tion 5.3, are effective at approximating continuous nonlinear functions, which make
them well-suited for system identiﬁcation. This represents the learning component
of indirect adaptive control.
When implementing a NN for adaptive control, the network weights may be
trained ofﬂine, or they may be dynamically updated online. In the case of ofﬂine
training, the network weights are computed prior to ﬂight based on an extensive set
of simulation data. When the NN is later implemented online, the weights remain
ﬁxed. In this case, the NN simply provides another functional way of performing
nonlinear regression to estimate parameters. It is an alternative to a recursive ﬁlter.
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Figure 8: Indirect Adaptive Control using a Neural Network with Online Training.
Figure 8 illustrates an indirect adaptive control structure in which the NN is
dynamically updated online. In this case, the NNweights are actively trained during
ﬂight based on the reference commands, control signals, and system response that
are provided as inputs. The training of the NN becomes an integral part of the
adaptation method.
Key Characteristics:
Convergence For online neural networks, the convergence rate for training has to
be sufﬁciently fast in order to make performance guarantees. Different types
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of optimization algorithms may be used to train neural networks, depending
on the size and structure of the problem, such as gradient descent, evolution-
ary algorithms, and simulated annealing. While these methods have different
convergence properties, neural network training typically suffers from slow
convergence due primarily to the prevalence of ﬂat regions of the objective
function and the large multi-dimensional space over which the search must
take place.
Transient Effects Using a neural network that has not yet converged as a means
of performing system identiﬁcation can introduce undesired transient effects.
Overﬁtting Poor generalization to new inputs, a common issue with neural net-
works. Can be overcome by training with diverse data sets that capture all
dynamic conditions.
Adequacy of Design Existence of solution is not guaranteed
4.7 Summary of Key Characteristics for Adaptive Control
Although the ﬁeld of adaptive control has matured signiﬁcantly, there are still a
number of issues that require further research. In 2006, Wise et. al. identiﬁed the
following open problems [84]:
Reference Model Design The appropriate selection of the model for the aircraft
is critical to respond to the situation. This is because the error which is the
difference between the actual model and the reference model is driven to zero.
Parameter Tuning Guidelines In the design process several parameters and ma-
trices are used that need tuning. Tuning of these could lead to transients which
needs to be addressed.
Adaptive Dead zone and Learning Rates The sizing of the dead zones and the
learning rate is critical. This is because fast learning rate can prevent de-
partures due to gust rejection. High learning rates introduce unwanted high
frequency oscillations and transients.
Adaptive Structural Mode Suppression compensate for structural mode interac-
tion with the control system. Presently the ﬁlters are often conservative and
reduce stability margins more than necessary to account for change in mass
properties and ﬂight envelope.
Gain and Phase Margins for Adaptive Systems Simulation analyses have shown
that adaptive system with high learning rates are not robust to time delays in
the feedbacks. This begs the question as to how much margin is present in the
design, and how best to analyze such a nonlinear problem.
32
The approaches to resolve these issues were developed by modifying the archi-
tecture of some of the existing adaptive control technologies. These approaches are
L1-adaptive control, combination of indirect-direct approaches.
In 2008, Jacklin et. al. identiﬁed ﬁve major gap areas [35]
• Deﬁning adaptive controller requirements
• Simulation models for adaptive control
• Proving learning stability and convergence
• On-line monitoring tools
• Adaptive controller certiﬁcation plans
Presently, requirements for certiﬁed controllers are well deﬁned. A similar well
deﬁned approach to deﬁne requirements for designing adaptive controllers needs
to be established. Along with deﬁning the requirements it is key to understand the
characteristics of adaptive control technologies that pose certiﬁcation challenges.
These key characteristics can be attributed to the execution of methods in real time
that deal with the estimation and update of values, and they can be grouped into
two main categories: convergence, and values of adaptive gain. Convergence has
several issues associated with the uncertainty to converge, and delay in converg-
ing. This leads to an unpredictable behavior that needs to be well understood and
bounded. During the process of convergence, the value of adaptive gains dynami-
cally change. Larger values of adaptive gain leads to unwanted behavior by most
of the adaptive algorithms. This means that online monitoring tools need to be
deployed to check the safety bounds and assure stable transient response. Further-
more, the stability criteria for traditional control does not apply to adaptive control
due to the nonlinear characteristics of adaptive control. As such, it should be rea-
sonable to replace the phase margin with a time delay margin as one measure of
stability for adaptive control.
Finally, it is important to consider the issue of non-determinism. Because the
adaptive gains are computed as a result of a recursive feedback process with stochas-
tic inputs, their values are inherently non-deterministic. For many, this is immedi-
ately perceived as a negative characteristic of the algorithm, and a stumbling block
for safety assurance. Is this necessarily true, or is it a misperception? At a recent
autonomy workshop hosted by the AIAA Intelligent Systems Technical Committee,
Dr. Kevin Wise of Boeing addressed this question with a useful analogy [83]. In a
traditional PID controller, the integrator state reaches a steady value at a trim ﬂight
condition. Due to small variabilities between aircraft and the stochastic nature of
the input signals provided to the controller, the internal value of this integrator state
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is also non-deterministic. The reason this is not perceived as a problem is because
the internal state is computed as a result of a stabilizing feedback law. Arguably,
the same claim can be made for the gains in an adaptive controller.
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5 Artiﬁcial Intelligence Algorithms
5.1 Introduction
The ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence consists of a diverse set of computational meth-
ods whose common trait is that they are either grounded in or inspired by human
intelligence. The advent of modern AI occurred in the 1950’s shortly after the ar-
rival of the digital computer, as several researchers set out to build a machine as
intelligent as a human being. Since then, the ﬁeld has grown in multiple directions
and has sparked the development of several new approaches that transcend AI and
have become disciplines in their own regard, such as statistical inference and data
mining.
In this chapter, we provide an overview of several different AI methods and al-
gorithms. Its important to note that some of the methods have signiﬁcant overlap
with others, such as qualitative physics and fuzzy logic. In addition, many of the
methods provide complementary functions, leading to hybrid implementations that
incorporate multiple technologies. For example, a fuzzy controller may use a neu-
ral network to implement its membership functions, and a neural network may be
trained using reinforcement learning algorithms.
As will be seen, AI methods pose unique capabilities that can provide important
beneﬁts to civil aviation. However, all civil aviation applications occur in an op-
erational setting with requirements for safety assurance, resource constraints, and
time-critical performance. It is therefore necessary to consider the key characteris-
tics of each AI method that present challenges to meeting these requirements.
In each of the sections that follow, we consider a different category of AI meth-
ods. We ﬁrst provide a general description of the overall method, and then discuss
key characteristics.
5.2 Machine Learning
Machine learning deals with the design and study of systems that learn from data.
The process by which learning is achieved can take on many different forms. In
general, though, the purpose of learning is to improve the performance of a task
based on experience. In this sense, the claim that learning has occurred is evidenced
by the fact that performance has improved after the gathering of experience.
All learning systems must be able to 1) represent data, and 2) generalize from
data. A training data set may ﬁrst be provided when the learning system is con-
structed. The learning system is designed to adapt so that it performs well (provide
some desired response) when given the training data set as an input. The learning
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system is also intended to generalize from the training data, so that it will continue
to perform well when given new, previously-unseen data. Some learning systems
continue to adapt while deployed.
There are three main sub-divisions of machine learning:
• Supervised Learning
• Unsupervised Learning
• Reinforcement Learning
In supervised learning, algorithms are trained on speciﬁc input data sets that
have a corresponding desired output. The objective in this training phase is to
generalize a function or mapping from inputs to outputs which can then be used
to predict outputs for new, previously unseen inputs. When operating online, the
trained system essentially applies what it has already “learned” (e.g. the mapping
function) so that it can draw inferences from new data.
With unsupervised learning, the input data sets do not have a corresponding
desired output. Instead, the learning objective is to discover structure in the data.
In other words, the goal is not to return the “right” answer for given data, but rather
to identify certain features or statistical properties that it exhibits. One widely-used
form of unsupervised learning is called clustering, where multiple sets of input data
are organized according to common characteristics into distinct clusters.
Reinforcement learning (RL) is focused on the use of intelligent agents to ac-
cumulate knowledge and develop policies. As the agent takes action it changes
its state within the environment, producing an outcome and an associated reward.
Through a discovery process, the agent can learn the approximate the value of tak-
ing an action in a given state. As more information is gained, the accumulating set
of action / result observations are used to learn an “action-value” function. With
ﬁnite states and actions, this can be done in a discrete table-lookup fashion using
algorithms such as active dynamic programming (ADP), temporal-difference (TD)
learning, and Q-learning.
Further generalization can be achieved by using some form of functional ap-
proximation for the tabulated data, such as a neural network. In fact, neural net-
works are often used to implement all three of the learning paradigms discussed
above. More details about neural networks are provided in Section 5.3.
Different forms of reinforcement learning have been used to carry out some ex-
tremely challenging problems in aerospace vehicle control. In particular, RL tech-
niques have been applied to different types of helicopter control problems. In [46],
RL is used to execute autorotation maneuvers in response to an engine failure;
in [2], a controller is generated from RL using a reward function that was derived
from piloted ﬂights, and is then used to autonomously perform aerobatic maneu-
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vers; and in [52], a RL algorithm was used to learn a controller for autonomous
inverted hovering. Others have applied Q-learning to the problem of morphing con-
trol, in which aerodynamic control is achieved by actively deforming the shape of
the vehicle [43, 75].
Key Characteristics:
Stochastic Process — The algorithms that implement the discovery process can be
stochastic in nature, explicitly assigning random values to algorithm parame-
ters. The purpose of injecting random numbers is to promote exploration of
new parts of the state space, and thereby improve learning. The consequence,
however, is that it prevents the algorithm from being perfectly repeatable for
the same set of input data.
Convergence — The convergence rate in machine learning depends strongly on
the stochastic properties of the input sources, as well as the learning algo-
rithms themselves. Some algorithms that are used in reinforcement learning
can exhibit poor convergence properties, especially if the input signals are
noisy. Others, such as Q-learning and value-iteration, have stronger conver-
gence properties.
5.3 Neural Networks
Neural networks are computational models that are inspired by the operation of the
nervous system. Some of the earliest work in artiﬁcial intelligence was aimed at
developing artiﬁcial neural networks in order to emulate the behavior of the brain
- speciﬁcally, the stimulation of interconnected neurons. The resulting structure is
a versatile mathematical tool that has proven to be extremely effective for a wide
range of statistical analysis applications.
The network structure is composed of nodes (neurons) connected by links. Each
node has multiple inputs and a single “activation” output. A representative mathe-
matical model for node j is given as:
aj = g
(
n∑
i=0
wi,jai
)
Here, ai is the activation value from a prior node, and aj is the activation value
of the current node j. The function g is called the activation function, which is
typically a hard threshold or a logistic function. The input to the activation function
is a weighted sum of all of n inputs to the neuron, where wi,j is the weight for using
input i at node j.
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Two important distinctions in network structure are that of feed-forward versus
recurrent, and single-layer vs multi-layer. In a feed-forward network, the connec-
tions between neurons always go in the same direction, from the input side of the
network to the output side - there are no loops. As such, the structure of a feed-
forward network forms a directed acyclic graph, and it is arranged in one or more
layers. Multi-layer networks have at least one layer that is internal to (or hidden
within) the network. A recurrent network uses feedback loops explicitly, returning
node outputs back as inputs to nodes in previous layers.
Neural networks are known to be good at pattern recognition, classiﬁcation,
clustering, and data ﬁtting. Essentially, the network can be designed by adding lay-
ers and deﬁning the weight values in order to approximate an arbitrary nonlinear
function. In a pattern recognition problem, for example, the task would be to rec-
ognize known patterns (for example, printed letters) given a set of pixel intensity
values from a camera. The number of inputs would be equal to the number of pixels
in the image, and there would be 52 output neurons, representing all possible upper
and lower case letters in the alphabet. The neural network would be trained on a
set of example data, and then (if all goes well) when an image of the letter “g” is
supplied, for example, only the output neuron associated with that letter would be
activated.
The letter recognition example described above is a case where a supervised
learning process would be used to train the network. Supervised learning is appro-
priate when there exists a desired mapping of inputs to outputs, and we want the
network to emulate this mapping. Neural networks can also be developed with an
unsupervised learning process. In this case, the network is given input data sets but
with no accompanying outputs. Rather than learning a function that approximates
an input/output map, as was the case with supervised learning, the goal here is to
detect patterns, or statistical relationships within the data. Unsupervised-learning
neural networks are often used for clustering tasks, where the input sets are grouped
into clusters based on different measures of how similar they are.
Within the framework of reinforcement learning, neural networks have been
used as function approximators, generalizing the utility function to go beyond the
ﬁnite limits of a discrete table-lookup. The use of neural networks in reinforce-
ment learning has proven particularly useful for complex, high-dimensional envi-
ronments, including systems with nonlinear continuous dynamics.
If a NN’s weights are ﬁxed once trained, the NN becomes highly determinis-
tic system that can probably be certiﬁed using existing methods, analogous to a
gain-scheduling table. However, the more likely use of NNs would be in dynamic
applications where they would be used to continuously learn/update their model of
some system behavior (e.g., aircraft dynamics), and thus they face the challenges
of all online learning methods.
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Key Characteristics:
Overﬁtting — A well-known drawback of neural networks is the possibility of
overﬁtting. This is a general phenomenon that can impact any type of function
approximator. A useful analogy is using a higher order polynomial to ﬁt data
when the trend is adequately captured by the lower order model. The higher
order polynomial can reduce the error on the data sets that are given, but it
may lead to larger errors on points outside of these data sets. The same holds
true for a neural network, where more nodes and layers can provide a better ﬁt
for the training data sets, but may result in poor generalization on new input
data.
Convergence — With most NN structures, there is no time-bounded guarantee that
the training process will converge to an effective classiﬁer or other NN sys-
tem; designing NNs remains essentially an art.
5.4 Expert Systems
Expert systems (ES) attempt to capture the knowledge and experience of human
experts and then use this information to form rules that suggest the best response
for a given state of the world. Historically, expert systems were one of the ﬁrst
successful methods of applied artiﬁcial intelligence.
Structurally, an ES is composed of two main parts: a knowledge base and an
inference engine. The knowledge base stores facts and rules about the environ-
ment that the system is expected to operate within. The inference engine uses the
knowledge base to ﬁnd a solution (or answer) for the given problem (or question).
Different types of inference engines may be used, including rule-based and case-
based methods.
A rule-based system applies a set if-then rules of the form: if A and B and C
then X and Y , where A,B,C are the conditions and X, Y are the consequents. If
all of the conditions are true, then the rule is triggered and the consequents are ﬁred.
The consequents may be new facts that are stored to the working memory inside the
system, or actions of some form that are sent outside of the system.
The reuse of a generic ES shell enables domain experts to directly author and
revise rules, an advantage that enables rapid prototyping of designs and makes the
code base easier to maintain. However, knowledge acquisition remains the most
intensive and time consuming aspect of an ES. As a result, ES designs tend to be
limited to domain-speciﬁc applications with a narrow scope, in order to reduce the
amount of knowledge acquisition that is required.
Expert systems can take on many different forms, and may be integrated with
other AI methods. For example, the knowledge base may be represented as a
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Bayesian Network (BN) in order to support probabilistic reasoning, and fuzzy logic
may be used to implement the rules in the inference engine. The system could
also be integrated with a learning component, where the knowledge base is updated
automatically through a separate learning process. BN is a multi-use tool for rea-
soning with uncertainty. It provides a systematic way to incorporate probabilistic
dependencies for events of interest or provides a formalism for reasoning with un-
certainty when partial beliefs are available. It is a tree structured network. A BN can
be used to learn causal relationships, and hence can be used to gain understanding
about a problem domain and to make predictions.
The inference engine applies rules from propositional logic and uses search
methods, such as forward chaining or backward chaining, to compute solutions.
With forward chaining, the algorithm starts with available input data, applies it to
the rules in the knowledge base, then eventually concludes with one or more result-
ing statements about the data set. These results may then be added to the knowl-
edge base. In contrast, backward chaining is a goal-directed method. It begins with
a goal, and applies logical inference to the knowledge base in order to determine
whether there exists any data to support goal.
The general problem of applying propositional logic to determine whether a
goal is met is commonly referred to as a satisﬁability problem - or SAT problem.
The SAT problem is a fundamental problem in AI and computer science in general,
as many different types of combinatorial problems, including planning and model
checking, can be reduced to checking SAT for a propositional logic sentence. All
SAT problems are in the computational complexity class NP-Complete, and in the
worst case require a combinatorial run time. For example, the worst case for a prob-
lem with n binary variables requires full enumeration, which has 2n combinations.
A substantial amount of research has been dedicated to developing more efﬁ-
cient SAT solvers. One of the most widely used algorithms is the Davis-Putnam-
Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) algorithm, which applies a form of complete back-
tracking [65]. DPLL uses a recursive, depth-ﬁrst enumeration of all possible mod-
els. Several variations have been applied to DPLL in order to enhance its ability to
scale up to extremely large problems. Some techniques make explicit use of ran-
domness. For example, a random restart can be done if the current run is not mak-
ing progress, randomly generating a new candidate solution, while avoiding conﬂict
clauses that have already been learned. Another popular method is called WalkSAT.
At each iteration, the algorithm chooses an unsatisﬁed clause and randomly picks
one variable in that clause to ﬂip. WalkSAT is best applied to problems where a
solution is expected to exist, as it is not capable or determining that the problem is
unsatisﬁable.
Key Characteristics:
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Completeness of Knowledge Base — In order for the ES to be effective, the knowl-
edge base must be provided a sufﬁcient amount of information, in the form of
primitive rules, in order for the inference engine to
Subjectivity of Knowledge Base — Parts of the knowledge base may be subjec-
tive. Multiple experts may in fact give contradictory inputs to form the knowl-
edge base. In such cases, it is an open question of how to properly identify
which set of rules is correct, because the notion of correctness is not clearly
deﬁned.
Long Run Times with Large Knowledge Base— Inference engines effectively ap-
ply some type of SAT solver to check whether the input data is supported by
the rule base. For large knowledge bases, the solution could take extremely
long run times. This could render the ES ineffective for operational settings
in which a timely result is needed.
Randomness in the Inference Engine – Some algorithms used to implement the
inference engine explicitly use random numbers to search for satisfying solu-
tions.
5.5 Fuzzy Logic
The concept of “fuzzy logic” was born in the 1960’s along with the introduction
of fuzzy set theory. In classical set theory, the membership status of an element is
binary – it is either a member of the set, or it is not. With a fuzzy set, however,
elements can have a partial “degree of membership” within the set. The extent to
which an element is in the set is deﬁned by a membership function, which is valued
in the interval [0,1].
For example, the element Honda Accord ﬁrmly belongs in the set Car, and so
classical set theory is sufﬁcient. However, is Honda Accord a member of the set
Foreign or Domestic? The answer is unclear. Honda is a foreign-owned company,
but it manufactures parts and assembles vehicles in the United States. Fuzzy set
theory is appropriate here, because it can have partial membership in both sets.
We could reasonably assign it a membership value of 0.6 for Foreign and 0.4 for
Domestic. It is important to point out that the choice of these numeric assignments
is arbitrary.
The notion of “fuzzy” does not represent probability or uncertainty in data.
Rather, it models the ambiguity that exists in the meaning or interpretation of the
data or event. As such, fuzzy sets prove useful when the information describing a
model is inherently imprecise.
Fuzzy logic is an extension of classical boolean logic that uses fuzzy set vari-
ables to express truth values. The application of fuzzy logic grew in popularity
through the 1980’s and 1990’s, primarily as a means for controlling complex sys-
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tems that were difﬁcult to model, and that had limited sensing or actuation. The
application of fuzzy logic in control systems has been proposed for a variety of ap-
plications, in aviation [27]. A fuzzy control system implements three main steps:
fuzziﬁcation, inference, and defuzziﬁcation.
Fuzziﬁcation The numeric values associated with sensory inputs are converted to
fuzzy values. For example, a velocity of 50 miles per hour could be converted
to fuzzy value of “fast”, whereas 80 mph would be “very fast”.
Inference Fuzzy inputs are applied to a rule base to determine the appropriate
fuzzy actions. For example, the fuzzy inputs of “fast” and “neighborhood
road” might have an associated rule that leads to the action “slow down”. The
combination of “very fast” and “neighborhood road” would infer a stronger
“slow down immediately”.
Defuzziﬁcation Fuzzy actions are converted into crisp, well-deﬁned output values.
For example, a fuzzy action of “slow down” could correspond to a numeric
deceleration command of 1 mph per second, but “slow down immediately”
might produce a 5 mph per second deceleration.
As the above examples indicate, classifying data is an important aspect of any
fuzzy logic controller. In fact, neural networks can be used in an unsupervised learn-
ing mode to perform data clustering for a fuzzy system. The grouping of related
data sets into clusters would provide the basis for deﬁning membership functions.
Key Characteristics: Some implementations of fuzzy logic use machine learning
to learn the membership functions. These systems inherit the same key characteris-
tics of those learning algorithms. Another characteristic unique to fuzzy logic is its
ambiguous deﬁnition of degrees of membership.
Ambiguity — The whole point of fuzzy logic is to provide an effective way to deal
with imprecision. Consequently, fuzzy logic algorithms themselves are also
grounded in ambiguity. The fuzziﬁcation and defuzziﬁcation steps involve an
arbitrary mapping between precise numeric values and imprecise conceptual
states. These steps rely on the use of membership functions, which could be
fully deﬁned a priori, or learned during execution via machine learning. In
either case, there is no universal way of assessing the merit and quality of the
membership functions. In other words, we cannot produce a measure of how
good the membership function is, because there is no “ground truth” to which
we can compare.
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5.6 Cognitive Architectures
A cognitive architecture [56] speciﬁes the underlying infrastructure for an intelli-
gent system. The architecture supports the creation and understanding of synthetic
agents that emulate the same capabilities as humans. A cognitive architecture in-
cludes aspects of cognitive agents which are: memory of an agent that stores the
goals, beliefs and knowledge, the representation of the elements, their organization
of the mental structure and the functional processes that operate on these structures.
The functional processes can be either utilizing the information or updating it based
whatever was learned.
With the increase in demand for enhancing autonomy for autonomous applica-
tions there is the need to integrate systems that exhibit intelligent behavior not just
improve components within the system. Thus there is a need for increased focus on
system level architectures that support complex cognitive behavior across a broad
range of relevant tasks.
These cognitive architectures have differences in the way they implement capa-
bilities or features. In some of the research efforts the architecture is static and in
others the architecture is allowed to grow. Learning is not part of all cognitive archi-
tectures. Also some approaches allow several components to execute concurrently
or one at a time. These are different ways cognitive architecture is implemented
based on understanding of certain aspects of human capability. Some of the cog-
nitive architectures that have been applied more frequently in different applications
are: ACT-R, Soar, ICARUS, PRODIGY and MIDAS.
Key Characteristics:
Convergence— Depending upon the learning mechanism implemented the algo-
rithms might not converge to a solution.
Uncertain behavior— Based on the learning mechanism used and the source data
used the response behavior will vary.
5.7 Planning and Scheduling
Automated planning and scheduling systems are designed to ﬁnd strategies or ac-
tion sequences that achieve some goals. Given a description of the possible initial
states of the world, a description of the desired goals, and a description of a set
of possible actions, the planning problem is to ﬁnd a plan that is guaranteed (from
any of the initial states) to generate a sequence of actions that leads to one of the
goal states. If the duration of actions or other temporal aspects are important, the
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problem may include elements of scheduling (i.e., determining not just what actions
should be taken in what order, but when).
There are many classes of planning problems, depending on whether charac-
teristics such as observability, controllability, nondeterminism or probabilistic be-
haviors, durative actions, etc. are included. Numerous planning algorithms have
been developed, most relying on some form of search through the space of possible
future states of the modeled system. Planning problems can often also be reduced
to equivalent satisﬁability and model checking problems, so solvers from those re-
search areas can also be used.
Key Characteristics: Planning and scheduling systems have been successfully de-
ployed in numerous real-world applications, including control of satellites ( [13])
and space telescopes ( [38]). However, they generally include several critical as-
pects that would make them challenging to certify:
Uncertain execution time — Most planners use deterministic algorithms but solve
problems that are at least NP-complete, which means that their execution time
on new problems is not predictable. Unless all of the problems that a partic-
ular system would ever face can be tested in advance, traditional certiﬁcation
methods would not apply.
No guaranteed solution — Many planning problems have no solution, and be-
cause they are NP-complete or worse, it is not possible to know whether a
solution exists without actually solving the problem.
5.8 Computer Vision / Machine Vision
The ﬁeld of computer vision (or machine vision) deals with the automated pro-
cessing and analysis of electro-optical sensory data. In a general sense, computer
vision may be viewed as a special case of data mining. Whether the speciﬁc task is
edge detection, object recognition, feature extraction, or centroiding, the common
objective is to extract useful information out of the raw data. Much of the develop-
ment in this ﬁeld has been guided by an attempt to mimic human vision, which is
extraordinarily good at quickly processing and understanding visual scenes.
With the introduction of digital cameras, images have become a readily available
sensor input for many systems. In manufacturing, for example, visual inspection is
routinely performed at points along the production line to spot defects. In spacecraft
operations, automated rendezvous and docking uses images as a primary source of
navigation data.
There are number of specialized sub-ﬁelds within computer vision:
44
Feature Extraction The data is searched to ﬁnd speciﬁc features such as lines,
edges, ridges, and ovals.
Detection / Segmentation Speciﬁc points or regions in the image are selected for
further processing. This selection is often based on the outcome of a lower
level feature extraction step.
High-Level Processing The focus shifts to pre-selected regions of the image along
with identiﬁed features in order to make a higher-level determination about
the image. Examples are:
• Comparison to a model database for anomaly detection (e.g. for quality
assurance in manufacturing)
• Estimation of image feature characteristics, such as incidence angle or
size (e.g. for navigation)
• Classiﬁcation of the image into one or more categories (e.g. for surveil-
lance)
An assortment of different algorithms are used to implement the various aspects
of computer vision listed above. The brunt of the workload tends to occur in the
feature extraction step. Finding geometric features within a large space of pixel
data, and then repeating that process to perform more complex pattern recognition,
has proven to be a stubbornly difﬁcult task for computers. As a result, a great deal of
research has been devoted to ﬁnding efﬁcient algorithms for this class of problems.
There are two many different image processing techniques to give an exhaustive
list. Instead, we will brieﬂy discuss a few different approaches that are used for
different aspects of image processing.
Canny edge detection is a widely used method for identifying edges in images.
It ﬁrst applies a Gaussian ﬁlter to smooth the image so that spikes from noisy pixel
regions do not trigger false edges. It then applies a gradient operator to compute the
intensity and direction of changes in pixel strength. A non-maximum suppression
technique to determine whether pixels are better candidates to form an edge than
their neighbors. This amounts to a prioritized search over a subset of the image.
Finally, edges are traced through a hysteresis thresholding procedure. A similar
technique is Canny-Deriche edge detection, which uses a different smoothing ﬁlter
that can be more easily tuned.
The Hough transform is a different technique of feature extraction, used primar-
ily to ﬁnd circles or ellipses. Given a target shape to ﬁnd, candidate objects in the
image are obtained from applying the Hough transform, and those candidates are
then voted on to produce a ﬁnal solution. The transformation takes (x, y) pixel coor-
dinates and puts them into the equation r = x cos θ+ y sin θ. Circles are found, for
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example, when edges are identiﬁed along (x, y) coordinates for a roughly constant
r value and θ ∈ [0, 2π).
The above two methods are popular techniques for low-level image processing:
detecting basic geometric shapes. Going a step further and identifying more com-
plex shapes, such as animals, vehicles, faces, and their orientation, is a much more
challenging problem in machine vision.
Recently, a research team from the University of Toronto developed an algo-
rithm called SuperVision, which decidedly won the ImageNet Large-Scale Visual
Recognition Challenge in 2012 with a recognition error rate of 16% - about twice
as good as the next best entry [64]. The challenge includes both image-level an-
notation, determining whether objects of a certain class are in the image or not,
and object-level annotation, ﬁnding known objects in the image and drawing a box
around them. To give an idea of the size and scope of this work, SuperVision used
a deep convolutional neural network, consisting of about 650,000 neurons in ﬁve
convolutional layers, with 60 million tunable weights. The network was trained
on 1.2 million images, which took 6 days to complete running in parallel on two
NVIDIA GPUs [41]. Since that competition, several other researchers have used
the deep neural network design and improved upon it. The recent winner of the
2014 contest is the Google-led project called GoogLeNet, which now achieves an
error rate of just 6.7%.
Key Characteristics:
Resources – The recent trend in machine vision is to use deep neural networks, as
they have demonstrated superior performance and scalability in the most chal-
lenging vision problems. However, the remarkable improvement in accuracy
with these methods comes at the cost of some hefty resource requirements.
Network sizes tend to be extremely large, with millions of tunable weights
and several hundred thousand neurons. This places stringent requirements
on computational resources, often resulting in parallel execution of multiple
processors in order to tackle the problem.
Training — Long training times and large data sets are required for deep neural
nets. This effectively prevents online training from being a viable option in
most operational settings.
Overﬁtting – Due to the extremely large size of the deep neural nets, overﬁtting is
a common problem.
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5.9 Qualitative Physics
Qualitative physics is a form of knowledge representation designed to reason about
physical systems using only qualitative abstractions. Essentially, the model of the
world is expressed at an abstract level using qualitative attributes of behavior, rather
than numerical simulations.
The ﬁeld of qualitative physics was originally motivated in the 1970’s with
Fahlman’s BUILD planner, which found ways to assemble complex towers out of
blocks. The planner spent most of its time modeling the physics of various block
conﬁgurations. However, the full numerical model used a level of precision that
was deemed unnecessary for the purposes of the planner.
One advantage of qualitative physics is that its models contain explicit explana-
tions of the macro-level behavior. Contrast this to a numerical simulation, where
any macro-level explanations must be separately deduced from the bottom-up, a
non-trivial task requiring signiﬁcant computational effort. The human brain is very
good at dealing with and properly characterizing imprecise quantities, especially
when it comes to pattern recognition and example-based learning. Computers, on
the other hand, are not well-suited for these tasks. The computer chips we have built
are much better (and signiﬁcantly more capable than the human brain) at storing
large amounts of data in terms of precise numeric values, and quickly performing
successive operations on those numbers.
Many of the mathematical models we use to describe physical systems involve
a great deal of approximation and simpliﬁcation. Even when a complete, high-
ﬁdelity model is available, the simulated behavior is often not informative and re-
quires further interpretation, which in many cases is represented qualitatively. From
this perspective, the precision used in the numerical simulation can turn out to be
completely unnecessary.
The application of qualitative physics invokes three fundamental pieces: 1) qual-
itative variables, 2) behavior rules, and 3) an inference mechanism. Qualitative vari-
ables take on a ﬁnite set of values, usually in the ordered set of symbols: +, 0,−.
The concepts of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division are explicitly de-
ﬁned for all combinations of these values. The description of the system being
modeled is expressed in terms of behavior rules that involve one or more qualitative
variables. These rules represent all of the knowledge about the system. The infer-
ence mechanism applies the behavior rules to the current set of qualitative variables
to predict the future state of one or more variables in the system. When the ba-
sic set of qualitative variables is insufﬁcient to capture the full behavior, additional
“landmark” variables are introduced. For example, a system may introduce new
landmark variables at each time point in order to capture the time-varying nature of
a system, as opposed to a system that is time-invariant.
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Key Characteristics: Qualitative physics is similar to fuzzy logic in many ways.
Both methods are used to efﬁciently dealing with imprecise or abstract quantities,
and both methods replace traditional high-precision numeric variables with a less
descriptive counterpart. At the same time, qualitative physics also resembles some
aspects of an expert system, with a knowledge base of rules and an inference engine
to operate over those rules in order to reason about (draw a conclusion or predict an
outcome for) the future behavior. As such, this class of methods inherits the same
key characteristics that are found in fuzzy logic and expert systems. In addition,
qualitative physics has some other characteristics unique unto itself:
Large Search Space — Because ﬁnite values (e.g. +, 0,−) are assigned to the
qualitative variables, problems involving search over the space of these vari-
ables suffer from a combinatorial explosion when the number of variables is
large.
Completeness of Rules — The behavior of the systemmodeled in qualitative physics
is limited to the set of behavior rules that are given to it. As these rules are de-
ﬁned in a qualitative way, it is difﬁcult to determine whether they adequately
capture the full range of behavior for the system being modeled.
Ambiguity — The attribution of values to the qualitative variables is arbitrary. Be-
cause the behavior models and variable representations are abstract rather than
numeric, there is no “correct” or “incorrect” way of assigning these values.
The possibility of multiple different acceptable values for a variable leads to
ambiguity, and creates a challenge for testing and algorithm validation.
5.10 Evolutionary algorithms
Evolutionary algorithms (EA) are a class of heuristic methods that have proven very
effective at solving global optimization problems. The general process of solving an
optimization problem involves ﬁnding a candidate solution that satisﬁes constraints,
evaluating the utility of that solution, and then progressing to a better solution. In
numerical optimization, gradient based methods choose the next candidate solu-
tion by moving along the direction of the cost function gradient. However, these
techniques are limited in that they can only be applied to continuous differentiable
functions, and they are not globally optimal – they only converge to a local mini-
mum of the function, which may not be the global minimum.
The term “evolutionary” refers to the manner in which EA methods compute
new candidate solutions. Just as neural networks are inspired by our understanding
of how the nervous system works, evolutionary algorithms are inspired by the pro-
cess of biological evolution. In the context of an EA, candidate solutions represent
individuals in a population, and the quality of each solution is measured by a ﬁtness
function. The process of the EA begins by generating an initial population (a set
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of candidate solutions), which may be done randomly or through some determin-
istic method – this represents the ﬁrst generation. The ﬁtness of each individual in
this generation is then evaluated, and the best-ﬁt individuals are selected for “re-
production”. In the reproduction process, new individuals are created by applying
crossover and mutation operations to the ﬁt parents. Finally, the next generation is
created by replacing the least-ﬁt individuals with the newly created offspring, and
the process repeats.
Applications within civil aviation that could utilize evolutionary algorithms in-
clude the types of problems that have a large number of variables, complex con-
straints and multiple objectives, especially those with non-smooth functions. Some
examples are trajectory optimization, departure and arrival scheduling in air traf-
ﬁc control, and large scale coordinated route planning by airlines. Evolutionary
algorithms, coupled with distributed (e.g. cloud) computing, can be enormously
powerful for ofﬂine optimization problems. One such application area is tuning
gain schedules ofﬂine, given plant model with uncertainties.
Key Characteristics: Evolutionary algorithms are typically used on large scale
problems in an ofﬂine setting. They provide a useful tool for ﬁnding globally opti-
mal solutions in a space of large variables, especially with complex and non-smooth
functions describing the objectives and constraints.
Existence of Solution – Some optimization problems are constrained to the point
where no feasible space exists. The constraints are sufﬁciently complex,
though, that the non-existence of a solution cannot be known until a solution
is attempted. For high-dimensional problems with non-convex and/or non-
smooth constraints, global methods must be used to search the existence of
a valid solution. In these cases, a signiﬁcant amount of computational effort
may be required only to conclude that no solution exists.
Injection of Randomness — The crossover and mutation operations are inher-
ently random in nature. Random perturbations are explicitly introduced in
order to create new candidate solution sets.
Premature Convergence — EAs are susceptible to premature convergence, where
the algorithm converges with a suboptimal solution before reaching the global
optimum.
5.11 Natural Language Processing
Natural language processing (NLP) is composed of computational methods that
read or listen to human language, and analyze the input to interpret its meaning.
This process requires NLP methods to recognize both the syntax and the semantics
49
of a language. Understanding the syntax involves the identiﬁcation of token words
or phrases from whichever medium the information is conveyed in, whether it be
digital characters, handwriting, or speech. Understanding the semantics involves
interpreting the ordered collection of those words and phrases to develop higher
order concepts and associations.
Most modern NLP algorithms are based on statistical machine learning, in which
rules governing the language are automatically learned through large example data
sets. Of the large number of different applications within the ﬁeld of NLP, two are
potentially useful to civil aviation.
Speech Recognition Determine the textual representation of speech. This might
be used to enable pilots to speak messages that can be transmitted to ground
control in the form of text messages.
Machine Translation Automatically translate text or spoken words from one hu-
man language to another. This could be used in international ﬂights to ease
the language barrier between the pilot and ground control.
Information Extraction Extract semantic information from text. This technique
could be used to enable voice operation of certain ATM or onboard aircraft
functions. It could also provide an automated mechanism for rapidly checking
the validity and safety of voice-issued directives from air trafﬁc controllers.
Key Characteristics: Most of the algorithms used to perform NLP are based on
machine learning, and so they inherit the same set of characteristics from those
methods. Another characteristic unique to NLP is the possible ambiguity of inter-
pretations:
Ambiguity — The extraction of semantics from symbolic text can lead to many
possible interpretations. In the absence of more context, it is not possible
to determine which interpretation is correct, leaving ambiguous results. This
creates a challenge for testing and validation, as the notion of correctness is
not clearly deﬁned.
5.12 Summary of Key Characteristics
In each of the AI methods discussed, we have called out a few key characteristics.
We focused on those characteristics that may pose challenges to using each method
in the operational setting of civil aviation, which has requirements for safety assur-
ance, resource constraints, and time-critical performance. The full set of identiﬁed
characteristics can largely be organized into the following main categories.
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Existence of Solution – Is there a solution?
With planning, model-checking, and optimization problems, the existence of
a solution is not guaranteed. For larger, more complex problems, it may take
a signiﬁcant amount of computational resources and time to reach this con-
clusion.
Convergence – How long will it take to reach the solution?
Many of the AI methods are recursive or iterative in nature. The algorithm
must converge to a usable solution within a reasonable amount of time in
order to be useful in an operational setting. Some machine learning tech-
niques have better convergence properties than others, and so this becomes an
important design criteria. Neural networks are powerful tools for function ap-
proximation and classiﬁcation, and can be used to implement the learning or
inference component of other AI methods. However, neural networks do not
have time-bounded guarantees that they will converge to an effective solution.
Ambiguity – Is the solution correct?
Ambiguity is built in to in a number of methods. In an expert system, the
knowledge base consists of rules deﬁned by experts, but they are often sub-
jective. If two experts were to deﬁne rules or thresholds differently, which
version is correct? Fuzzy logic and qualitative physics explicitly deal with
ambiguous or imprecise concepts. They assign values to fuzzy or qualita-
tive variables based on observed input data, but this assignment is subjective
and arbitrary. In natural language processing, the interpretation of words and
phrases can often have multiple semantic meanings, leading to ambiguous re-
sults. In all of these cases, the inability to precisely prescribe correctness or
incorrectness to the information used in the algorithm makes it difﬁcult to test
and validate.
Randomness – Can the solution be repeated?
Several methods explicitly inject randomness as part of the algorithm. Evo-
lutionary algorithms for optimization use a random process to perform mu-
tations on individuals in the population that represent candidate solutions.
Algorithms that implement the discovery process in reinforcement learning
often apply random perturbations to ensure new parts of the search space are
explored, in order to promote learning. SAT solvers, used in planning and
sometimes as the inference engine for expert systems, can employ methods
that utilize random numbers in an attempt to more efﬁciently navigate the
search space. All of these methods use randomness as a tool to improve con-
vergence, but the inherent drawback is that it prevents the algorithms from
being repeatable. This can lead to challenges in testing and validation.
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In the next section, we shift our focus to certiﬁcation, and discuss how the key
characteristics in both adaptive control and artiﬁcial intelligence can lead to speciﬁc
certiﬁcation challenges.
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6 Certiﬁcation Challenges
Having examined the characteristics of adaptive systems, we will next consider how
these characteristics can lead to challenges in the certiﬁcation process. Current civil
certiﬁcation processes are based on the idea that the correct behavior of a system
must be completely speciﬁed and veriﬁed prior to operation. The fact that adaptive
systems change their behavior at run-time is contrary to this idea in many ways.
In general, many AI methods have unique characteristics that do not ﬁt naturally
within context of existing certiﬁcation guidelines. This is due to the fact that the
certiﬁcation policies, conceived decades ago and still in use today, were not written
with the needs and capabilities of AI in mind [27].
In this section we will use the characteristics of adaptive systems that have been
described to identify categories of challenges that arise from those characteristics.
6.1 Comprehensive requirements.
One persistent challenge presented by adaptive systems is the need to deﬁne a com-
prehensive set of requirements for the intended behavior. The dynamic nature of
these systems can make it difﬁcult to specify exactly what they will do at run-time.
Complete description of desired behavior. Requirements must be measurably com-
plete in the sense that execution of the test cases derived from them will provide
complete structural coverage of the source code (up to the coverage metric required
by the software assurance level). Creating a set of requirements that completely de-
scribes the desired system behavior and provides structural coverage can be difﬁcult
even for conventional systems. Deﬁning such requirements for adaptive systems is
likely the most common and difﬁcult challenge that we have identiﬁed in this study.
Decomposition of requirements. System requirements must be decomposed and
allocated to hardware and software in the system design. These allocated require-
ments must together guarantee that the system-level requirements are satisﬁed.
Deﬁning the necessary software requirements to guarantee the stability, conver-
gence, and boundedness is a challenge that must be addressed for adaptive control
algorithms.
6.2 Veriﬁable requirements
Assuming that an applicant is able to deﬁne a comprehensive set of requirements
for an adaptive system, it may be difﬁcult to verify those requirements.
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Availability of veriﬁcation method. One necessary characteristic of a good require-
ment is that it must be veriﬁable. This means that there must be some veriﬁcation
method available that is appropriate for the artifact and the requirements that are
to be veriﬁed. Some of the components in AI algorithms may present challenges
of this sort. What are the requirements for an inference engine and how should its
behavior be veriﬁed? How can we show that a rule database in an expert system is
correct? Furthermore, adaptive systems often involve discrete and non-linear oper-
ations that may now need to be veriﬁed analytically due to their complexity. Areas
where new veriﬁcation approaches may be required include:
• Veriﬁcation of hybrid systems. This involves modeling the discrete and con-
tinuous domains together to verify the correctness of the overall system. It
exercises the interaction of these two domains so a more realistic model of
the overall system can be evaluated. Model checking of hybrid systems has
the potential to address trust issues with certain types of non-linear behavior,
and current research is continuing to improve scalability.
• Veriﬁcation of non-linear systems. New decision procedures to reason about
non-linear operations are being developed and incorporated into advanced
model checking tools.
Well-deﬁned behavior. Another important characteristic of a good requirement is
that it must be possible to determine if a test (or analysis) produces the correct
result. This may be difﬁcult to deﬁne a priori for some adaptive systems.
Implementation language. The implementation language for AI software may present
another challenge. Current certiﬁcation guidance assumes the use of imperative
languages like C/C++, while many AI algorithms are implemented in functional
languages like Lisp or ML. We are not aware of any tools for computing coverage
metrics for functional languages. In fact, it is not clear that structural coverage is a
meaningful measure of completeness for functional languages.
Structural coverage. Structural coverage metrics are a key certiﬁcation objective
to demonstrate completeness of requirements, adequacy of test cases, and absence
of unintended behaviors. If structural coverage cannot be obtained for the software
in an adaptive system, some other methods will be needed to satisfy the underlying
objectives. DO-333 provides some direction as to how this might be done using for-
mal analysis in place of testing, but this has not been demonstrated for an adaptive
system.
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6.3 Documented Design
Many certiﬁcation requirements amount to providing detailed documentation of the
system. This may present difﬁculties for some adaptive systems if they were not
initially developed with certiﬁcation in mind.
Control of source code. Many AI systems are based on large open source libraries
produced and revised over time by many different organizations. This software
would need to be brought under active conﬁguration control to prevent unauthorized
changes that could invalidate veriﬁcation results or add unintended functionality.
Traceability. Traceability (among requirements, test cases, and code) is an im-
portant element of the current certiﬁcation process. Traceability may be difﬁcult
to implement when software is based on open source libraries developed by many
different people and organizations.
6.4 Transparent Design
The certiﬁcation process assumes a that perspicuous, transparent design and soft-
ware implementation is being presented for evaluation. Since the certiﬁcation au-
thorities must be convinced that requirements have been met, they must (at least
to some reasonable degree) be able to understand the artifacts and evidence that is
brought before them. This may be challenging in several ways.
Deterministic behavior. As noted earlier in this report, we have to be careful how
we use this term. In many cases, the adaptive algorithm itself is not nondetermin-
istic. It is just handling uncertainty in the environment or the vehicle operating
condition, in the same way that any control system responds to its sensed environ-
ment. On the other hand, there are some algorithms that make use of stochastic
processes as part of their computations. This may even be acceptable if there are
accompanying proofs of convergence or correct behavior. However, current certi-
ﬁcation process is based on an expectation that algorithms are deterministic; that
is, the computed results, computation time, and resource utilization are predictable
at design time. Any real lack of determinism will present challenges for current
certiﬁcation processes.
Conventional design artifacts. Many AI algorithms include unconventional design
artifacts. By this we mean computing methods, data structures, or languages that
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are unfamiliar to certiﬁcation authorities. Thus, there can be an expertise gap be-
tween system developers and regulators. This gap will make it difﬁcult to convince
regulators that an adaptive system based on unconventional methodologies satisﬁes
certiﬁcation requirements.
Complexity. The complexity of conventional software designs already stretches
the capabilities of current veriﬁcation technologies, and can be very difﬁcult for a
reviewer (or developer) to completely understand. Adaptive systems include em-
bedded models, solvers, and new algorithms that greatly increase their complex-
ity compared to conventional systems. Just the amount of software involved can
present a signiﬁcant challenge to understanding and veriﬁcation, independent of
any more sophisticated measures of complexity.
No unintended functionality. Another consequence of complexity is that it is more
difﬁcult to demonstrate the absence of unintended functionality. This is an impor-
tant objective of the veriﬁcation process.
6.5 Summary
These certiﬁcation challenges are summarized in Table 1. The table also lists some
of the adaptive algorithms that are likely to be impacted by each challenge.
The certiﬁcation challenges faced by adaptive algorithms will also be related
to their application within the aircraft. Based on an understanding of the charac-
teristics of each algorithm we can attempt to categorizie them as to their expected
function and then assess their criticality. Table 2 provides some possible applica-
tions for different algorithms and assigns a possible software level based on that
functionality.
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Table 1: Summary of Certiﬁcation Challenges
Certiﬁcation
Challenges Description
Impacted
Algorithms
Complete
description of the
desired behavior
(Comprehensive
Requirements (CR))
Requirements that completely describe
the behavior and provides structural
coverage
Adaptive Control
(AC), Learning
methods,
Evolutionary
Algorithms(EA),
Planning and
Scheduling(PS),
Qualitative Physics
(QP)
Guaranteeing
performance and
good behavior (CR)
Requirements that guarantee
convergence, stability and boundedness
MRAC,L1-AC,
Machine Learning,
Cognitive
Architecture (CA),
PS , EA, Neural
Nets(NN)
Availability of
Veriﬁcation method
(Veriﬁable
Requirements (VR))
Requirements should be veriﬁable by
some method (review, analysis, or
testing)
Expert Systems
(ES), EA, ACT-R,
Soar
Well deﬁned
behavior (VR)
Determining by test or analysis that the
system produces the correct result
Fuzzy Logic, QP,
Natural Language
Processing (NLP)
Implementation
Language (VR)
The language used for implementation is
suitable for veriﬁcation activities
NLP
Structural Coverage
(VR)
Structural coverage metrics are used to
demonstrate completeness of
requirements, adequacy of test cases, and
absence of unindented behaviors.
AC, ES, EA
Control of source
code (Documented
Design (DD))
Control over changes to and integration
of open source software
Expert Systems
Traceablity(DD)
Tracing design, code, test cases to
requirements
AC, ES, EA, NN
Deterministic be-
havior(Transparent
Design (TD))
Behavior that does not involve any
randomness in computing the future state
of the system
NN, EA,
Conventional design
artifacts(TD)
Design artifacts that have been
traditionally used and known to
regulators
MRAC, MIAC,
L1-AC, PS, ES, EA,
CA
Complexity(TD)
The sophisticated ways in which the
adaptive algorithms interact with the
system
Expert Systems,
EA, NN,
No unintended
functionality(TD)
Guaranteeing that the algorithms do not
interact with the system leading to
unintended functionality
IAC, Machine
Vision, NN
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Table 2: Example applications for adpative algorithms
Algorithm Example Application Possible SoftwareLevel
L1-Adaptive
Control, Direct
MRAC
Flight Control and Fault Management Level A
Indirect adaptive
control, Adaptive
control with Neural
Networks
Flight Control Level A
Cognitive
architecture with no
learning
Rule-based automated procedures Level C
Reinforcement
Learning
Pilot advisory system (weather, etc.) Level D
Expert
Systems/Cognitive
architectures with
learning
Pilot advisory system Level D
Evolutionary
algorithms
Flight planning and optimization of
activities
Level B or C
Mission Planning Flight planning Level B or C
Neural Network Pilot advisory system Level D
Computer vision Synthetic vision Level A or B
Qualitative Physics Flight planning and conﬂict avoidance Level A or B
Natural Language
Processing
Pilot and ATC interface Level A
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7 Mitigation Strategies
The general issues surrounding certiﬁcation of adaptive systems technologies for
aviation were discussed in Section 6. Here we identify several potential approaches
to dealing with these issues.
There are three questions to be asked in approaching certiﬁcation of an adaptive
system:
1. Does the algorithm provide a signiﬁcant beneﬁt (in terms of safety or per-
formance) compared to current approaches? In other words, is it providing
a beneﬁt that cannot be accomplished using current approaches? If not, an
implementation based on traditional (non-adaptive) technology is preferable
and there is no need to proceed further.
2. Is the algorithm dependable? Can we actually demonstrate the safety of an
aircraft that relies on this algorithm? There must be some rational basis for
believing that the technology does what it claims to do. If not, then there are
fundamental issues with use of this technology in a safety-critical application
apart from certiﬁcation considerations.
3. Can we produce a convincing argument that the algorithm is dependable?
There may be barriers in the current certiﬁcation process to producing or
presenting this evidence, but in principle, we should be able to modify our
processes to accommodate this if there are clear beneﬁts to doing so.
If we have answered the ﬁrst two questions afﬁrmatively, then it is worth con-
sidering what strategies might allow us to achieve certiﬁcation for an that aircraft
includes adaptive systems. The following sections describe mitigation strategies
that may provide a way forward for some of the adaptive / intelligent systems we
have evaluated. Certiﬁcation of adaptive / intelligent system may require combina-
tion of these strategies.
7.1 Education
We have seen that there can be an expertise gap between developers and regulators
when it comes to adopting new technologies. In fact, the commercial aviation in-
dustry is itself very conservative and (for good reason) usually reluctant to switch to
the latest technology. However, we are convinced that for some adaptive algorithms
this reluctance is unwarranted. Some approaches to adaptive control (such as those
based on the L1methodology) have been proven to be dependable and predictable in
ﬂight tests, and there seem to be no actual barriers to their certiﬁcation. In fact, the
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very purpose of the adaptive component in these cases is to make the aircraft safer
to ﬂy when unsafe conditions are encountered. The roadblocks appear to consist
of misunderstandings and misapplied descriptions (such as “nondeterministic”). In
this case, no changes to the certiﬁcation process are required. We would overcome
the perceived barrier with a combination of education and demonstrations that the
new technology can be certiﬁed using current processes.
7.2 Modiﬁed Certiﬁcation Standards
Current standards assume static behavior speciﬁcations for aircraft functions. It
may be possible to relax this assumption and other constraints in a principled way.
The goal here would be to modify our existing standards in a way that retains the
underlying safety principles, but also permits a more dynamic software structure.
In some ways, this can be seen as analogous to the work undertaken in developing
DO-178C to accommodate new technologies such as formal methods and model-
based software development. The same approach could be used to provide new
guidance in the form of a Technology Supplement directed toward certain classes
of adaptive systems.
7.3 New Certiﬁcation Methods
Current standards impose a ﬁxed and implicit rationale for system safety. For ex-
ample, [30] describes work to identify and make explicit the assurance case argu-
ment underlying DO-178C. Researchers in the UK [21] have previously explored
ways to justify the substitution of one technology for another while maintaining
the same level of safety provided by DO-178B. The main idea was to show that
the new technology provided evidence that was at least as convincing as the pre-
vious technology in terms of the underlying (implicit) safety case. Certiﬁcation
approaches based on the development of a safety case for the aircraft (including its
adaptive components) would in principle provide more ﬂexibility to use advanced
algorithms, demonstrating the safety of the adaptive algorithm by using the most
appropriate evidence, while not sacriﬁcing safety. However, there is much work to
be done before applicants would have sufﬁcient expertise to produce an accurate
and trustworthy safety case, and regulators would be prepared to evaluate one.
7.4 New Veriﬁcation Approaches
Current test-based veriﬁcation processes will never be sufﬁcient to assess the behav-
ior of adaptive systems. Factors such as software size, complexity, unconventional
artifacts, probabilistic computations, and large state spaces have been discussed as
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reasons for the difﬁculty of testing. Testing will have to be replaced or augmented
by analysis based on formal methods or other mathematical techniques from the
control theory or computer science domains. An example of a veriﬁcation approach
not currently allowed would be a probabilistic analysis that shows that an algorithm
is sufﬁciently likely to converge to a solution within a given deadline.
7.5 Architectural Mitigations with Certiﬁcation Support
Suppose that we are to certify an adaptive function that provides some advanced
capability related to improved performance or recovery from a failure or upset,
but we are unable to verify the behavior of the function with the required level of
assurance. In some cases it may be possible to bound the behavior of the adaptive
function by relying on a carefully designed system architecture. The key idea is
to be able to treat the adaptive system differently based on when it executes (e.g.,
during different phases of ﬂight).
One approach is called the simplex architecture [14]. It relies on three smaller,
high-assurance functions: a system status monitor, a simpler backup for the adap-
tive function, and a switching function. During normal operation, outputs from the
adaptive function are used by the rest of the system. If the monitor detects that the
adaptive function is not behaving correctly (e.g., it has not converged, or computed
new output before its deadline) or the system as a whole is approaching a state in
which correct behavior of the adaptive function has not been veriﬁed, then the sys-
tem will switch to using outputs from the simpler backup function. There are a
number of technical challenges in this approach related to deﬁning the switching
boundary and blending smoothly from the adaptive function to the backup. For ex-
ample, unwanted and potentially unsafe transient effects could be introduced if the
transition mechanism were not designed properly. However, the inherent advantage
in this approach is that, due to the architecture design, the safety of the vehicle
never depends soley upon the adaptive function. The adaptive function is used dur-
ing “normal” operating conditions and switched off during “abnormal” conditions
when it might not be dependable.
An alternative approach uses a complex adaptive function to recover the vehicle
in the case of a catastrophic failure or upset condition. In this case there is a con-
ventional system that is used during normal ﬂight operation, and a high-assurance
monitor and switch that only invokes the adaptive system when the vehicle would
otherwise be destroyed. The function of the monitor is to guarantee that the adap-
tive function is never used during normal operations. This is similar in concept to
an airbag system in an automobile. In contrast to the ﬁrst approach, the adaptive
function is switched off during “normal” operating conditions and only switched on
during “abnormal” conditions (when the vehicle would be lost anyway).
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The same methodology is employed in control systems with adaptive augmen-
tation. Using this control architecture, a traditional robust inner-loop controller is
designed and effectively controls the system when the dynamics are close to the ex-
pected model. When the observed dynamics deviate signiﬁcantly from the expected
model, the traditional controller is no longer capable of providing the desired perfor-
mance, resulting in noticeable tracking errors. At this point, the adaptive controller
begins to provide a more dominant contribution to restore desired performance.
While such architectures have been demonstrated and could be implemented
with high-assurance, the current certiﬁcation process does not allow for this type of
reasoning about time-varying levels of assurance.
7.6 Paradigm Shift: Licensing
Perhaps the most revolutionary approach to certiﬁcation for advanced, adaptive
techniques is to depart entirely from the current paradigm and instead emulate the
techniques used to train and approve human pilots or operators. Pilots are licensed
to ﬂy based on demonstrating knowledge and skill through hundreds of hours of
training and evaluation [4]. Similarly, humans performing other critical tasks such
as air trafﬁc control are trained and tested extensively before they enter an opera-
tional role. Extending this licensing procedure to autonomous software would lead
to an analogous system of gained trust. Certiﬁcation would be eventually attained
through extensive, though not exhaustive, demonstration of knowledge and skill by
the advanced software systems.
This approach has several key advantages:
Performance focus. A licensing approach would focus more resources on the ac-
tual proven performance of a system than its development methodology/process.
One of the criticisms of DO-178C is that it focuses more on the the devel-
opment process and producing evidence of compliance, than on evaluation
of the resulting software. According to this argument, the current process
invests thousands of person-hours in creating reams of costly, deeply inter-
twined documentation that may or may not have a direct impact on system
safety. In a licensing approach, the investment emphasis would shift towards
more extensive training, testing, and revision of the actual safety-critical sys-
tem. High-ﬁdelity simulations are already used extensively to test both human
and synthetic systems; a licensing approach would just increase this focus.
Reduced cost. Once high-ﬁdelity simulations are developed to a sufﬁcient level to
support the bulk of training and testing autonomous systems, the cost of re-
testing and re-licensing a new or revised system would become dramatically
lower than current certiﬁcation costs.
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Reduced stagnation/concretization. Currently, certiﬁed avionics systems are es-
sentially cast in stone the moment they are certiﬁed. It can cost more than
$1M just to “open the box” and consider making a change to a certiﬁed sys-
tem, because of the costs associated with re-certiﬁcation. Furthermore, the
implied fault-free guarantee of “certiﬁcation” provides a strong incentive for
developers to not continue testing or validating a deployed system— any fault
they ﬁnd could potentially make them liable for prior incidents: knowledge of
the fault is worse than ignorance. General Motors’ experience with ignition
switches provides a recent example.
Realistic expectations and reduced liability. A licensed system would not have
an implied guarantee of perfection, it would have a proven track record of
performance. Properly legislated, this could relieve a system developer from
the legal liability that threatens all advanced technologies, much as parents are
not held liable for the driving accidents that their licensed children cause. Al-
ready, self-driving cars are proving safer than human-driven cars [70]. Every
year, more than 35,000 people are killed in America alone in car accidents. If
deploying autonomous cars could cut that in half, it would be a huge societal
gain. But that will not happen if the car manufacturers can be held liable for
the remaining 17,000 deaths. Errors by human pilots are at least a contribu-
tory factor in most airplane crashes. How can we make it safe for a company
to deploy an autonomous system that could avoid most of those crashes, but
not all of them?
The licensing barrier could be much higher for an autonomous system than a
human, of course, because the costs are non-recurring. Once a piece of software is
class-certiﬁed to ﬂy a particular aircraft, for example, it can be copied essentially
for free into all other similar aircraft. This is simply not possible with humans– we
cannot duplicate a skilled senior pilot, and it takes decades to grow another one.
So instead of requiring a few hundred hours of simulation training and live ﬂight
before licensing, as with people, an autonomous system might be required to ﬂy for
hundreds of thousands of simulated hours, and thousands of real hours, encounter-
ing thousands or millions of faults and contingencies, demonstrating competency
far beyond what any human could possibly show in a lifetime.
As with any testing-based validation, one key problem with a licensing approach
is that any test-based evidence of acceptable behavior may be completely invali-
dated by a change to the system. Human abilities are remarkably robust to changing
inputs– a person may experience a momentary muscle spasm or a power glitch in
a control system, and will still retain the skills and abilities he had earlier. Only
major medical difﬁculties might interfere with a pilot’s ability to ﬂy. For example,
you cannot disable a pilot simply by saying something to him or her. In contrast, we
can reach into the “brain” of a software system and tweak it, and the consequences
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can be vast and (in the worst case) unintentional. A single line change to a soft-
ware system may have broad, inadvertent consequences. Consequently, evolving or
changing software is much more hazardous than exposing a human to changes, or
even asking a human to change. Hence there is a need for relatively inexpensive,
high-ﬁdelity simulation testing environments that can be used to essentially re-test
a full range of desired behaviors in both nominal and off-nominal situations, prior
to deployment of any revised system.
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8 Roadmap and Future Directions
We have surveyed current work in adaptive and intelligent systems, including both
adaptive control schemes and those based on AI techniques. Based on the survey
we have identiﬁed different characteristics of the adaptive algorithms and linked
them to aspects of the current certiﬁcation process that could prevent deployment
of these systems. We have proposed several possible mitigation strategies that could
provide alternative paths to eventual certiﬁcation (or some equivalent demonstration
of compliance with safety regulations) if that is determined to be desirable and
appropriate.
In this section, we conclude with comments on two related workshops and a
roadmap that puts these adaptive systems and mitigation strategies on a timeline.
The goal is to suggest a way forward, targeting the “low-hanging fruit” ﬁrst and
identifying longer range research needs to address more challenging problems.
8.1 Related Workshops
Certiﬁcation of adaptive systems is currently an active area of inquiry, motivated
in part by the demand for UAVs with greater autonomy in both military and civil
applications. AFRL is working on roadmap speciﬁc to autonomy certiﬁcation as
part of a series of workshops they began in 2013 called “Test and Evaluation, Ver-
iﬁcation and Validation of Autonomous Systems (TEV&V).” [4]. The stated goal
of this workshop, which was split across industry, academia, and government, was
to “identify, understand and categorize the unique challenges to the certiﬁcation
of safety critical autonomous systems by identifying the Veriﬁcation and Valida-
tion (V&V) approaches needed to overcome them.” Members of our project team
participated in the ﬁrst workshop focused on industry. The workshop dealt with a
number similar concerns to those we have documented here.
Some interesting components of the vision from the TEV&V workshop include:
• Fast certiﬁcation and recertiﬁcation, including system changes
• Self-testing systems: monitor and expand own performance envelope
• Integrated safeguards and active and continuous V&V (embedded in instru-
mentation)
• Autonomy that can be “trained” and certiﬁed like a pilot
Additional information about this workshop is provided in Appendix A.
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We organized a special session on Certiﬁcation Considerations for Adaptive
Systems as part of the March 2014 meeting of the Aerospace Control and Guid-
ance Systems Committee (ACGSC). The objective of the session was to gather
input from researchers and practitioners in the aerospace guidance and control com-
munity on adaptive systems being planned or developed, and to discuss the chal-
lenges that these new systems might face related to certiﬁcation. The session was a
great success with lively discussion among the participants. The ACGSC workshop
helped shape our thinking about a roadmap to investigate certiﬁcation of adaptive
systems. Key outcomes from the workshop include:
• Enhanced awareness of certiﬁcation concerns in the aerospace guidance and
control community.
• Examples of relevant adaptive control and AI algorithms that are being devel-
oped for aerospace applications.
• Idenitiﬁcation of L1 adaptive control as a good candidate for a near-term
proof-of-concept demonstration.
• Discussion of licensing for autonomy algorithms as a viable alternative ap-
proach to certiﬁcation.
8.2 Roadmap for Certiﬁcation of Adaptive Systems
Based on our survey of adaptive and intelligent systems, we have grouped the dif-
ferent approaches into four categories based on the severity of changes to the certi-
ﬁcation process that they would require. We have ordered these categories ranging
from presently certiﬁable to very challenging to serve as a roadmap for future in-
vestigation. The four categories are:
No Change to Certiﬁcation Process. Based on discussions with a number of re-
searchers and industry control engineers, we believe that L1 adaptive con-
trol can be implemented as part of an aircraft control system and certiﬁed
with no changes to the current process. This methodology eliminates some
of the barriers to certiﬁcation that may be found in other adaptive control
approaches, speciﬁcally by decoupling estimation and control, and ensuring
that time delay margin is bounded away from zero. The barriers that remain
appear to be related to misunderstandings based on incorrect generalizations
about all adpative control algorithms, and the need to develop a complete set
of requirements appropriate for an L1 control system. We recommend that a
demonstration project be undertaken to produce the certiﬁcation evidence for
an example system based on the L1 methodology to illustrate what this might
look like in practice.
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Minor Modiﬁcation of Certiﬁcation Process. Approaches that are based upon ar-
chitectural mitigations may be realizable with relatively minor modiﬁcations
to the certiﬁcation process. In these examples, the new components that guar-
antee adpative systems are only executed during the intended ﬂight conditions
could be veriﬁed and certiﬁed using traditional processes. The only change
required would be acceptance of this approach to permit adaptive functions
with lower levels of demonstrated assurance to operate as part of a system
architected to provide high assurance. An example of such a system is an
MRAC controller in which the excitation signal is only applied for a limited
time after fault detection. Operational characteristics of the system while the
excitation signal is being applied may not normally be acceptable, but in this
proposed architecture it would be allowed if guaranteed to occur only under
the prescribed fault detection and recovery scenario.
Major Modiﬁcation of Certiﬁcation Process. Some approaches that we have dis-
cussed will require more extensive changes to the certiﬁcation process. An
example that ﬁts in this category is the use of run-time veriﬁcation to guaran-
tee that the outputs of a planning algorithm are safe for the guidance system
to enact. The onboard use of complex veriﬁcation software or inference en-
gines is not anticipated at all by current standards. Assurance of this approach
would apply the standards for onboard software development to components
that would normally be dealt with using tool qualiﬁcation guidance. It would
also be necessary to determine how run-time veriﬁcation failures are handled
in the absence of human supervision.
Paradigm Shift: Licensing. A license-based approach to autonomous control sys-
tems is clearly the most radical departure from the current certiﬁcation regime.
However, recent developments in automous cars show that this approach may
ﬁnd public and governmental acceptance in the near future. Further study is
needed to identify requirements and constraints that might be necessary to
apply a license-based approach to automous aircraft, and to achieve a level
of dependability and conﬁdence that is at least as high as achieved by current
processes.
This roadmap is illustrated in Figure 9 with examples of adaptive algorithms
within these categories.
67
Figure 9: Roadmap
9 List of Acronyms
ADI — Adaptive Dynamic Inversion
ADS-B — Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
AI — Artiﬁcial Intelligence
BDI — Belief, Desire, Intention
CATMT — Collaborative Air Trafﬁc Management Technologies
CSS-Wx — Common Support Services - Weather
DAI — Distributed Artiﬁcial Intelligence
EA — Evolutionary Algorithm
FMS — Flight Management System
GTM — Generic Transport Model
MIAC — Model Identiﬁcation Adaptive Control
MRAC — Model Reference Adaptive Control
NAS — National Air Space
NGATS — Next Generation Air Transportation System
SIFT — Smart Information Flow Technologies is a small research company spe-
cializing in intelligent automation and human-centered systems.
SLAM — Simultaneous Localization and Mapping
SWIM — System Wide Information Management
TCAS — Terminal Collision Avoidance System
TEV&V — Test, Evaluation, Veriﬁcation and Validation
V&V — Veriﬁcation and Validation
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10 Glossary
Adaptive Control — A control policy with 1) parameters that may be adjusted,
and 2) some mechanism for automatically adjusting those parameters online
based on measured performance.
Adaptive System — The computational element of the active feedback process
changes, in order to maintain desired performance, in response to failures,
threats, or a changing environment.
Artiﬁcial Intelligence — A broad class of computational methods that are de-
signed to operate with intelligence, primarily by 1) learning from experience,
and 2) making decisions based on learned information to achieve a goal.
Adaptation Method — The algorithm that governs how online parameter estima-
tion is conducted in an adaptive control framework.
Direct Adaptive Control — The system uncertainty parameters are estimated and
used directly in the control law to cancel the tracking error.
Indirect Adaptive Control — A system identiﬁcation process estimates uncertain
model parameters. These parameters are then used as inputs to a control de-
sign method that computes the controller gains.
Non-Determinism — In general, a nondeterministic algorithm is one in which
the output cannot be repeated with certainty, given the same input. Sec-
tion 1.1.3 describes four types of nondeterminism: Environmental nondeter-
minism, probabilistic algorithms, uncertain existence of solutions, and con-
currency.
Overﬁtting — The set of independent basis functions used to ﬁt a given set of data
is too complex. This results in the model ﬁtting random noise which is only
present for the supplied data sets, causing it to be a poor approximation of
new data.
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Appendix A
Background
A.1 Recent History of Research Programs with Adaptive Flight Control
The ﬁeld of adaptive control has matured over the last 50+ years, with important
contributions from a large number of researchers. The full body of work encom-
passing the historical development of adaptive and intelligent ﬂight control is well
beyond the scope of this book. However, we have identiﬁed a few speciﬁc programs
where noteworthy advancements have been made, and summarize them here.
A.1.1 Damage Tolerant Control
Rockwell Collins developed Damage Tolerant Control (DTC) technology to mit-
igate common failures for combat aircraft, such as primary control surface dam-
age, airframe damage, and complete propulsion system failure. Under a DARPA-
sponsored program, a series of ﬂight tests were performed to showcase four key
aspects of the DTC technology. The all-attitude autopilot formulation was shown
to enable aerobatic maneuvers and automatic recovery.from unusual attitudes, while
enforcing ﬂow angle and load limits. The model-reference adaptive control (MRAC)
module, with short-term persistent excitation, demonstrated the ability of DTC to
recover baseline controller performance after losing actuation (on the aileron, rud-
der, and/or elevator). Automatic Supervisory Adaptive Control (ASAC) returned
an aircraft with catastrophic wing damage to trimmed and controllable ﬂight within
a few seconds, enabling the vehicle to complete its mission and perform an au-
tonomous landing. Finally the Emergency Mission Management System (EMMS)
provides the ability for an aircraft which suffered complete engine failure to glide
back onto a feasible landing trajectory. The combination of these modules dramat-
ically enhances the survivability of combat aircraft [39].
A.1.2 SDC - Self-Designing Controller
The SDC was an AFRL program with ﬂight tests conducted in 1996. An indirect
form of adaptive control was ﬂown in the VISTA / F-16 aircraft. Real-time param-
eter identiﬁcation was performed with a simulated failure of a missing horizontal
tail. They performed modiﬁed sequential least squares for online parameter estima-
tion. A receding horizon optimal control law was implemented, which was updated
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in real-time based on the model parameter estimates. Flight-tests showed that the
handling qualities were sufﬁcient to land the aircraft [84].
A.1.3 IFCS - Intelligent Flight Control System
The IFCS program, led by Boeing in the late 1990’s, developed an indirect adap-
tive control system using neural networks to learn (or recursively estimate) several
aerodynamic coefﬁcients to form linear models of the aircraft dynamics. Optimal
feedback gains were then computed based on these linear models by solving the
Riccati equation online [84].
A.1.4 RESTORE - Reconﬁgurable Control for Tailless Fighter Aircraft
RESTORE was a program sponsored by the Air Force Research Laboratory in the
1990’s aimed at developing reconﬁgurable ﬂight software capable of adapting to
unknown failures and damage [85]. The Boeing-led effort developed applied a dy-
namic inversion control law as the base control system, and used an on-line neural
network to adaptively regulate the errors resulting from nonlinear plant inversion.
In addition, an on-line system identiﬁcation method was used to estimate the con-
trol derivatives used by the control allocation algorithms. The system identiﬁcation
used a least-squares estimation method, and applied ﬁlters to the pilot commands
in order to ensure the measured signals contained sufﬁcient information to estimate
the plant parameters. This effectively provided persistent excitation, a necessary
condition for convergence of the learning process in adaptive control. The algo-
rithms developed under the RESTORE program were ﬂight-tested on the NASA
X-36 tailless aircraft with two successful ﬂights in 1998.
A.1.5 JDAM - Joint Direct Attack Munition
The Joint Direct Attack Munitions program began in the late 1990’s with the pur-
pose of developing guidance kits to retroﬁt existing un-guided munitions. The same
approach used in the RESTORE program was applied by Boeing to the JDAM MK-
84 munition, which was demonstrated in at least two successful ﬂight tests. The
production LQR based ﬂight controller was replaced entirely with a new scheme
that used dynamic inversion for inner loop control, augmented with a direct adap-
tive controller using a neural network. This approach precluded the need for any
gain-scheduling or wind-tunnel testing. Instead, the adaptive system was designed
for a single point in the ﬂight envelope using general aerodynamic data from the
missile DATCOM data sheet. In addition, the neural network was only trained on-
line, during ﬂight [68, 84].
79
A.1.6 IRAC - Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control
The Integrated Resilient Aircraft Control (IRAC) project began at NASA in late
2006 as part of the broader and ongoing Aviation Safety Program. The purpose of
IRAC is to research new ﬂight control methods capable of providing “onboard con-
trol resilience” to ensure safe ﬂight is maintained in the face of adverse conditions.
Flight tests for various research ﬂight control laws have been conducted on NASA
Dryden’s F/A-18A systems research aircraft.
Research objectives for IRAC include:
• Improve stability and maneuverability for safe landing using adaptive controls
• Develop validated and integrated aircraft control design tools for safe ﬂight
under adverse conditions
• Improve understanding of the dynamics of loss-of-control (LOC) incidents
and design control software to help regain control
• Enhance engine models to improve engine response during LOC incidents
One of the key components of IRAC is to examine adaptive control technology
as a solution for improving operational safety of the aircraft in off-nominal, adverse
ﬂight conditions. To this end, several different applications of adaptive control have
been tested using the NASA Generic Transport Model (GTM) [9], and ﬂight tests
have been conducted on the AirSTAR [24].
A.1.7 AirSTAR - Airborne Subscale Transport Aircraft Research
The NASA AirSTAR system, operated at NASA Langley Research Center, is a
5.5% dynamically scaled version of the Generic Transport Model aircraft. It is
powered with twin turbines, has a 6 foot wingspan, weighs approximately 54 lbs at
takeoff, and is fully equipped with ﬂight test instrumentation.
The AirSTAR platform has been used to ﬂight-test several different adaptive
control methods from different research groups. In particular, ﬂight tests with L1
adaptive control demonstrated the ability to prevent loss of control at high angles of
attack and maintain pilot handling qualities throughout a large portion of the ﬂight
envelope without gain scheduling [24].
A.2 Previous Studies
Several different studies have been conducted in recent years on the topics of ap-
plying artiﬁcial intelligence, adaptive methods and autonomous systems to civil
80
aviation. Although a complete review of all such studies is beyond the scope of this
report, we do provide an overview of the most relevant ones, most of which have
been published within the last year.
A.2.1 Artiﬁcial Intelligence with Applications for Aircraft, 1994
In 1994, the FAA issued a report entitled “Artiﬁcial Intelligence with Applications
for Aircraft” [27]. This report focused primarily on three types of methods: neural
networks (NN), expert systems (ES), and fuzzy logic. At the time the report was
written, the early 1990’s, these were among the most popular techniques being
studied in the rapidly evolving ﬁeld of AI. Several speciﬁc applications of these
methods are discussed, along with some attention to the issues of certiﬁcation and
human factors. Neural networks were also identiﬁed as a technology to support
intelligent monitoring and diagnostics, but most of the report focuses on expert
systems. In particular, various types of expert systems are described as candidate
tools to support navigation, ﬂight management, and diversion routing.
Even though the state of the art in AI and aviation has grown signiﬁcantly in the
last twenty years, we still face the same fundamental issues regarding safety, V&V,
and certiﬁcation. The authors point out that the unique characteristics apparent in
developing and testing AI-based software are not addressed in RTCA/DO-178B,
the governing document in aviation certiﬁcation. Standardization across different
areas of AI was recommended for easing the certiﬁcation process in general. Spe-
ciﬁc recommendations include a common run time inference engine to standardize
expert system shells, and the adoption of a standard language, such as Common
LISP. In addition, a thorough discussion is provided on veriﬁcation and validation
of expert systems, and how the process compares to that of conventional software.
The key issues related to certiﬁcation of AI technologies were identiﬁed as fol-
lows:
• Learning - The use of AI based systems with learning components is deemed
unlikely in civil aviation due to the apparent difﬁculty to demonstrate that they
will maintain ﬂight within the safe operating envelope.
• Safety - The issue of safety is based primarily on how AI is perceived. The
application of a technology that is generally perceived as being mature and
safe will be viewed as contributing to safety, rather than degrading it.
• Veriﬁcation and Validation - For expert systems, the knowledge base must be
complete and error free. A more general challenge is identifying a suitable set
of tests to demonstrate safety.
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• Design Guidance - The current FAA document, RTCA/DO-178B, does not
accommodate AI-based methods. More work is required to develop meaning-
ful design guidance for AI-based systems.
• Human Factors - With AI supplementing or replacing cognitive tasks of hu-
mans, the potential loss of situation awareness, loss of proﬁciency, and over-
conﬁdence in the AI system should be understood and mitigated.
A.2.2 VVIACS - Veriﬁcation and Validation of Intelligent and Adaptive Control Sys-
tems, 2005
This was an AFRL funded study performed by Lockheed Martin and Carnegie Mel-
lon University that ended in 2005. [74] The main goals of this research were to
1) classify emerging safety-critical control systems based upon characteristics that
may challenge traditional certiﬁcation, and to 2) identify V&V tools and processes
with the potential to efﬁciently support these systems.
The LM/CMU team identiﬁed several emerging fundamental properties that are
required for new safety-critical control systems, all of which must tested, evaluated,
veriﬁed and validated in order to be fully certiﬁed. As a result, they project that cost,
schedule and risk will grow at faster rates (possibly exponential) as complexity of
the control system increases, with the main drivers being software, simulation, test,
and test tool development. A key ﬁnding is that advanced V&V tools focused on the
above drivers should signiﬁcantly reduce the overall V&V cost and effort needed to
support advanced safety-critical emerging control systems.
A.2.3 Veriﬁcation of Adaptive Systems, 2013
In 2013, NASA Langley and Honeywell together delivered a report to the FAA
entitled “Veriﬁcation of Adaptive Systems” [82]. This report provides an overview
of adaptive algorithms, focusing primarily on adaptive control, neural networks and
genetic algorithms.
To motivate an analysis of how certiﬁcation would be applied to an adaptive
system, they used an example adaptive control structure that augmented traditional
gain-scheduled control with a trigger. The outcome of this analysis was a table list-
ing DO-178B/C objectives and a corresponding discussion of why those objectives
might be hard to satisfy in the chosen AS example. Several of the cited difﬁculties
are due to the AS learned state space making it more difﬁcult to perform certain
tasks that are required to support DO-178B/C objectives. The qualiﬁcation of de-
velopment tools and veriﬁcation tools are also cited, as well as developing adequate
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test cases, and verifying that system level stability and convergence properties are
retained through requirements decomposition and implementation.
In order to properly derive and validate safety and functional requirements for
adaptive systems, the report recommends the use of structured, objective, evidence
based safety cases. It is also recommended that safety properties should be speci-
ﬁed explicitly for when adaptation may be engaged, bounding the allowable learned
state-space, and the fall-back to a backup response if those safety bounds are ex-
ceeded.
The report also provides several recommendations for achieving requirements
veriﬁcation of adaptive systems, including:
• Use model based design techniques with well-deﬁned syntax and semantics,
with requirements expressed explicitly in the model
• Use formal methods to provide adequate test coverage and proof of safety and
performance properties
• DO-178C and its supplements are necessary, as DO-178B is inadequate to
provide software design assurance
• The certiﬁcation process will need to rely more on veriﬁcation by analysis
and formal proofs rather than test
A.2.4 Test and Evaluation, Veriﬁcation and Validation of Autonomous Systems, 2013
In 2013, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) began hosting a three-part
workshop on “Test and Evaluation, Veriﬁcation and Validation of Autonomous
Systems”. [4]. The stated goal of this workshop, which was split across industry,
academia, and government, was to “identify, understand and categorize the unique
challenges to the certiﬁcation of safety critical autonomous systems by identify-
ing the Veriﬁcation and Validation (V&V) approaches needed to overcome them.”
Upon completion of the workshop, the identiﬁed challenges and complementary
approaches are to be organized into 3-6 thrust areas that will feed the AFRL Auton-
omy Strategy and Research goals, as well as the DoD TEV&V portfolio.
The industry workshop, which included 23 participants from 14 different com-
panies, focused on high-level obstacles to the adoption of automated systems in civil
and military aviation. A substantial portion of time and discussion was focused on
how to certify such systems, with an AFRL ofﬁcial citing that non-determinism and
learning behavior represents the leading risk of future autonomous systems. The
ﬁnal report noted that the biggest takeaway by far from this industry workshop was
the collective discussion of a new “licensing paradigm”, in which the certiﬁcation
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process for an autonomous system is reformed to be more like the licensing process
used for human pilots.
In the academic workshop, which included 21 participants from 14 different
universities, the group identiﬁed the biggest challenges they face in TEV&V. The
list was reﬁned into six broad categories: 1) Requirements, Models and Design;
2) Human-Machine Interaction; 3) Modeling and Simulation, Testing; 4) Runtime
Assurance, Veriﬁcation; 5) Highly Complex Interactive Autonomy; 6) Policy - User
Impact. One of the interesting takeaways from this workshop was the suggestion
that the certiﬁcation process will become more like the process used on humans as
automated systems become more human-like.
The government workshop, which included 18 participants from AFRL, iden-
tiﬁed a 2030 vision for what is needed in TEV&V of autonomy, along with 14
technical objectives to support that vision. Some interesting components of the
2030 vision include:
• Fast certiﬁcation and recertiﬁcation, including system changes
• Self-testing systems: monitor and expand own performance envelope
• Integrated safeguards and active and continuous V&V (embedded in instru-
mentation)
• Autonomy that can be “trained” and certiﬁed like a pilot
A.2.5 Autonomy Research for Civil Aviation: Toward a New Era of Flight, 2014
In July of 2014, the National Research Council issued a report entitled “Auton-
omy Research for Civil Aviation: Toward a New Era of Flight”. [55]. This report
explores the use of “increasingly autonomous” (IA) systems in civil aviation, identi-
fying unique characteristics, potential beneﬁts, and barriers to implementation. The
vision for integrating autonomy is described for three distinct platforms: crewed
aircraft, unmanned aircraft, and air trafﬁc management.
The council underscores the belief that while the aviation industry is on the
threshold of profound change, due to the rapid growth of autonomous systems,
it will be a signiﬁcant challenge to integrate these new platforms and algorithms
safely and efﬁciently into the national airspace. The authors also point out that
existing certiﬁcation criteria and processes do not properly account for the unique
characteristics of advanced, increasingly autonomous systems. Within their list of
14 potential barriers to the adoption / integration of IA systems, we ﬁnd: veriﬁca-
tion and validation, the certiﬁcation process, and trust in adaptive/nondeterministic
systems.
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The report concludes with a suggested research agenda to address the techni-
cal challenges that underlie the implementation barriers. Some of council’s ﬁnal
recommendations that are most pertinent to our report are to:
• Develop methodologies to characterize and bound the behavior of adaptive/nondeterministic
systems over their complete life cycle.
• Develop standards and processes for the veriﬁcation, validation, and certiﬁca-
tion of IA systems, and determine their implications for design.
• Determine how IA systems could enhance the safety and efﬁciency of civil
aviation.
• Develop processes to engender broad stakeholder trust in IA systems for civil
aviation.
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Appendix B
Application Areas in Civil Aviation
In this appendix, we discuss a few different areas in civil aviation where adaptive
and intelligent methods have the potential to provide signiﬁcant beneﬁts.
B.1 Air Trafﬁc Management
Air Trafﬁc Management (ATM) encompasses all of the systems and operations that
enable aircraft to be actively monitored and directed by ground-based facilities from
departure to arrival.
From gate to gate, the aircraft is handed off from one controlling authority to
another. At the airport, control is divided into four main segments: Clearance De-
livery, Ground Control, Local Control, and Terminal Control. Prior to departure,
the planned route of the aircraft is approved by Clearance Delivery, which ensures
that it has the proper route and slot time. The Ground Control segment directs
all non-runway ground trafﬁc, including taxiing between the gate and the runway.
The Local Control (or Tower Control) segment is responsible for clearing the air-
craft for takeoff and landing. Local weather conditions and runway separation con-
straints may lead Local Control to hold aircraft prior to landing, or divert them to
another airport. Tracking and all other in-ﬂight air trafﬁc services in the vicinity of
the airport are handled by the Terminal Control segment. A single Terminal Radar
Approach Control (TRACON) facility can track aircraft in a 30-50 nautical mile
radius, which may service multiple airports. The primary function of the Terminal
Control segment is to ensure safe separation in congested airspace.
In general, ATM consists of several interconnected segments of supervisory
control, where humans are tasked with monitoring status, planning and schedul-
ing time-ordered actions, identifying conﬂicts, and then resolving those conﬂicts as
they arise. Many of these tasks can be improved to be made safer and more efﬁcient
with through automation. Intelligent systems, such as expert systems, planners, and
automated agents, clearly have potential applications in this area.
The Next Generation Air Transportation System (NGATS), commonly referred
to as NextGen, includes a broad set of enhancements to the United States ATM
infrastructure, as well as technology upgrades on the aircraft themselves. In par-
ticular, the following ATM-related components of NextGen may beneﬁt from the
application of adaptive and intelligent software:
Collaborative Air Trafﬁc Management Technologies (CATMT) A suite of en-
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hancements to the decision-support and data-sharing tools used by air traf-
ﬁc management personnel. The goals are to reduce operator workload and
provide a more collaborative environment among controllers and operators,
thereby improving efﬁciency in the National Airspace System. AI methods,
such as expert systems and algorithms for planning and optimization, may be
used as decision aid tools.
System Wide Information Management (SWIM) A network structure that will
carry NextGen digital information. SWIM will enable cost-effective, real-
time data exchange and sharing among users of the National Airspace System
(NAS). AI methods that enable emergent behavior from decentralized agents
may be used to enable efﬁcient and robust operation of the SWIM network.
Common Support Services-Weather (CSS-Wx) A system that will provide the
FAA and NAS users with same-time access to a uniﬁed aviation weather pic-
ture via the SWIM network. This will enable collaborative and dynamic de-
cision making among all users of the NAS. AI methods for machine learning
and data mining may be used to identify weather conditions and patterns that
can impact certain classes of aircraft.
B.2 Route-Planning
One of the ongoing objectives in air trafﬁc management is the notion of free-ﬂight.
This refers to the idealistic future capability of aircraft to be granted the freedom
to plan and ﬂy their own routes, independent of a centralized authority. Clearly,
this raises safety concerns as it introduces a greater potential for in-air collisions.
However, given the advancements of onboard technology such as GPS receivers
and ADS-B transponders, and the overwhelming burden placed on a centralized air
trafﬁc control paradigm, the eventual shift towards a more decentralized system is
certainly plausible.
When individual aircraft have more autonomy to determine their own ﬂight path,
this opens up a large decision space that is amenable to route-planning. Trajectory
optimization methods can be used online to ﬁnd minimum-fuel or minimum-time
trajectories. These may change in non-trivial ways based on weather and aircraft
loading conditions. The big airlines are particularly interested in taking more con-
trol of their route-planning, and having the freedom to adjust them dynamically, as
this can add up to enormous fuel savings and better performance in terms of on-time
arrivals.
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B.3 Automatic Flight Control
Automatic ﬂight control is commonplace on all commercial and private planes to-
day. Conventional methods use classical control designs to provide robustness and
desirable pilot handling qualities, but these methods are limited to operation within
the nominal ﬂight envelope. As was discussed in Chapter 4, the application of
adaptive control technology has the potential to improve safety and performance by
maintaining control even when the aircraft experiences damage, a failure, or departs
from the safe operating condition.
B.4 Flight Management
In modern avionics, the ﬂight management system (FMS) is responsible for au-
tomating a wide range of in-ﬂight tasks. Generally speaking, the goals of the FMS
are to reduce pilot workload, improve aircraft safety, and increase fuel efﬁciency.
AI related applications of the FMS would include health monitoring, fault de-
tection, and diagnostics, which are discussed in separate sections below. Another
area of interest is decision aid tools to recommend courses of action in response to
ﬂight critical events. One example is recommending the best place to land given
diminished ﬂight capability if the aircraft suffers a catastrophic failure or damage.
B.5 Collision Avoidance
Ensuring collision avoidance has become a rising challenge as the density of air
trafﬁc has increased in recent years. The standard system regulated by the FAA
is called the Trafﬁc Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Components of TCAS
include communications hardware, a processor, and a cockpit display.
TCAS regularly interrogates all other aircraft within a set range. The other air-
craft reply with their altitude, and the interrogating aircraft computes their range and
bearing. The TCAS processor uses other sensor inputs to generate trafﬁc advisories
and/or resolution advisories when another aircraft enters the protected airspace.
The TCAS system is currently in place and will be merged with new transpon-
ders of the class Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). ADS-B
uses a GPS receiver to determine its precise position, and automatically shares this
data along with additional ﬂight information on a broadcast frequency. The TCAS
and ADS-B systems are compatible, in that the processing component of TCAS
can utilize the information provided via ADS-B messages, rather than relying on a
two-step interrogation / response.
Collision avoidance will become an increasingly important and challenging topic
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as unmanned air systems (UAS) are integrated into the national airspace. Already,
several reports have been cited of near collisions between civilian passenger aircraft
and remotely piloted air vehicles. A particular issue is the use of quad rotors, which
can easily maintain ﬂight by hovering for extended durations, creating a situation
in which the pilot can easily retain control of the vehicle even when it is beyond
the line of sight. This severely reduces or in some cases completely eliminates the
pilot’s situational awareness of the vehicle’s environment. Given that automatic
sense and avoid technology will almost certainly be a requirement for any UAS to
be allowed into the controlled airspace, AI-based methods for machine vision and
planning may become enabling technologies.
B.6 Fault Detection and Diagnostics
Within the aerospace industry, data mining can be a particularly useful tool for
identifying and predicting failures. For example, as part of Flight Operations Qual-
ity Assurance, airlines regularly download vehicle health data from the ﬂight data
recorders and store it in a database. Applying data mining methods to this database
can enable the discovery of important trends and precursors to component failures
or other hazardous events.
The same approach can be used to optimize maintenance schedules, so that the
projected risk of component failures is minimized. These are examples of ofﬂine
applications to discover new knowledge about historical data, techniques that em-
ploy different types of data mining, which is rooted in machine learning. Once this
type of analysis has been done, representations of the knowledge (trends, relation-
ships, etc.) can be used onboard the aircraft to support the real-time execution of
vehicle health monitoring, fault detection, and diagnostics.
B.7 Multi-UAV mission
Multi-UAV or multi-autonomous agent missions require adaptive or intelligent net-
working behavior to maintain connectivity to accomplish a mission. This can be
accomplished by Cognitive Network Management System (CNMS) which is re-
sponsible for automated, policy-based real time network management for complex
Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) networks. CNMS reduces the workload for the
operator in positioning of mobile networked devices for the following:
• maintaining connectivity
• increasing/maintaining the connection bandwidth
• deal with interference issues
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• increasing the coverage area.
The CNMS supports fully distributed policy learning mechanisms [?] that allow
CNMS to adapt at run-time to unanticipated network conditions and application re-
quirements by creating and distributing new locally learned policies. CNMS will
play a signiﬁcant role in the execution of multi-UAV missions. CNMS also pro-
vides support for if/how to mitigate interference. This is done by selecting one
among several strategies to reliably send the information to avoid jamming. This
will specially be helpful in dealing with high interference regions of operation or
under jamming attacks.
90
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form ApprovedOMB No. 0704-0188
2.  REPORT TYPE 
Contractor Report
 4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE
Certification Considerations for Adaptive Systems  
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
NNL13AC67T
 6.  AUTHOR(S)
Bhattacharyya, Siddhartha; Cofer, Darren; Musliner, David J.; Mueller, 
Joseph; Engstrom, Eric
 7.  PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
NASA Langley Research Center                     
Hampton, Virginia 23681
 9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC  20546-0001
 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
     REPORT NUMBER
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
NASA
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Final Report
Langley Technical Monitor:  Kelly J. Hayhurst
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Unclassified - Unlimited
Subject Category  63
Availability:  NASA STI Program (757) 864-9658
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
STI Help Desk (email:  help@sti.nasa.gov)
14. ABSTRACT
Advanced capabilities planned for the next generation of aircraft, including those that will operate within the Next Generation Air Transportation System 
NextGen), will necessarily include complex new algorithms and on-traditional software elements. These aircraft will likely incorporate adaptive control 
algorithms that will provide enhanced safety, autonomy, and robustness during adverse conditions. Unmanned aircraft will operate alongside manned aircraft 
in the National Airspace (NAS), with intelligent software performing the high-level decision-making functions normally performed by human pilots. Even 
human-piloted aircraft will necessarily include more autonomy. However, there are serious barriers to the deployment of new capabilities, especially for those 
based upon software including adaptive control (AC) and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. Current civil aviation certification processes are based on the 
idea that the correct behavior of a system must be completely specified and verified prior to operation. This report by Rockwell Collins and SIFT documents 
our comprehensive study of the state of the art in intelligent and adaptive algorithms for the civil aviation domain, categorizing the approaches used and 
identifying gaps and challenges associated with certification of each approach.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Adaptive systems; Artificial intelligence; Certification
18. NUMBER
      OF 
      PAGES
99
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)
(443) 757-5802
a.  REPORT
U
c. THIS PAGE
U
b. ABSTRACT
U
17. LIMITATION OF 
      ABSTRACT
UU
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
3.  DATES COVERED (From - To)
September 2013 - October 2014
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
NNL13AA05B
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
357672.04.04.07.02
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT
      NUMBER(S)
NASA/CR-2015-218702
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and 
Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person 
shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1.  REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
03 - 201501-
